Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-004 *6 January 1995*

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EU Ambassador to Albania Briefs Newsmen on Aid

95P20333A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 15 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by Edi Paloka: "News Conference of the Ambassador of the European Union in Albania, Elio Germano: The EU Had an Opportunity Once Again to Confirm Its Good Political Will to Support Albania in the Direction of Democracy and the Market Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

—The harmony between the government structures and the EU [European Union] is being developed and intensified on a mutual basis.

—Long-term programs with maximum effects and the future of cooperation between the EU and Albania.

—The program of the government in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund is essential.

The EU ambassador in Tirana held a news conference on 14 December at the mission's headquarters. He stressed that the purpose of the meeting was to report on EU-Albanian relations.

"In 1994, the EU once again had an opportunity to confirm its good political will to make strong economic and financial resources available to Albania in order to support the country in its transition to democracy and a market economy," Germano said. Then he gave the figures for the assistance the EU gave to Albania in 1994: 64 million ECU in various forms and fields, such as agriculture, health, education, the infrastructure of the highway sector, etc. Germano mentioned the programs on which the granting of aid and credits is based, such as "Tempus" and "Cross Border." He said: "Some 15 million ECU were used to increase wages."

Commenting on the use and the results of this aid at the present time, Ambassador Germano pointed out that, since it is a matter of reform, the results of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program cannot be seen immediately. These results will be more evident when the structures are completed in the country.

Explaining that there is a period of time between the approval of a program and its implementation, Germano said that a qualitative leap will be noted with the opening of the construction sites included in the 1994 programs. This year, the most importance was given to the infrastructure, in which [EU] involvement has been much greater during the past year than in previous years. In 1994, more than 50 percent of the aid has been used for financing and for construction sites.

Commenting on relations between Albania and the EU, Germano said that in general, the harmony between the government structures and the EU is being developed and intensified on a mutual basis. "There have been some difficulties in a general framework. You know these difficulties, but the important thing is the fact that the effect is isolated," he said. The EU assistance plan for 1994 balances out as positive.

Germano's report to the press concluded with a presentation of future programs.

Albania and the [European] Commission have had discussions for the purpose of drawing up multi-year programs, which would signify a qualitative leap. This would permit a better use of the assistance and would have maximum effects. Germano said: "In 10 to 15 days, a new stage in our relations will begin." He mentioned negotiations with Greece and Italy on a five-year cross-border program that will soon become a PHARE program. Germano talked about important meetings in 1995 such as the G-24 in Brussels and a conference on civil investments in Tirana.

He said, in conclusion: "Let me remind you that Albania continues to be linked to the EU by an agreement for collaboration and cooperation, which is only the first stage in further and deeper relations."

Then the question and answer period began. Responding to the question of the GAZETA SHQIPTARE journalist on how much aid was absorbed and on the results of this aid in 1993, Germano said that certain criteria should be taken into consideration in regard to the absorption of aid. He explained that a program begun in 1993 cannot be implemented completely in 1993. There are management, training, and planning schedules that prevent this. Absorption also involves the capacity of management to define a strategy. Albanian management has an absorption capacity; and despite the incomprehensible delays, it must be said that the absorption capacity is high.

Germano replied in the affirmative to the first question from the RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE journalist as to whether the difficulties in relations between the EU and Albania—which he mentioned in his report—referred to the blocking of aid by Greece. He said: "Although the EU is indivisible and decisions are approved only by unanimous vote, there was a blocking and there was a reaction to the immediate granting of 18 million ECU, which would take place on the basis of a report that the commission would send to the Council of Ministers in regard to the current situation in Albania."

[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE journalist:] The Albanian Government is implementing reform based on a program prepared in collaboration with the IMF. Some people think this is not the road Albania should follow. What is your opinion?

In response to the second question of the RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE journalist, Germano said economic reform cannot be achieved if we do not start from a macroeconomic principle for the budget. Therefore, this program that has been prepared in collaboration with the IMF is essential. This is the basis for everthing that will happen later.

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When asked about the commission's decision to prohibit the export of food from Albania after the outbreak of cholera, Germano explained that this decision has been rescinded and that the prohibition is in force only for seafood products.

The Albanian-TV journalist was interested in the way in which EU assistance to Albania was monitored, and whether or not it went for the purpose for which it was intended.

In this connection, Germano said: "Of course it goes where it is supposed to go. There are some controls. I am a European Commission monitor and the Court of Accounts is another monitor. There are always controls during specific phases. There are specialists who verify that the funds are used properly."

Germano answered other questions, about the agreement of association that is expected to be signed between Albania and the EU and about the assistance the EU gives to investors who come to Albania.

At the end of the conference, Elio Germano, EU ambassador in Tirana, wished the journalists happy holidays.

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SDS, DPS Have First Contacts Since 1992

AU0501192395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Consultations among representatives of parliamentary forces are continuing. The newly elected leadership of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] introduced itself to the leadership of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] at a 30-minute meeting at DPS headquarters.

The two groups expressed readiness to exchange certain internal organizational documents.

At this time we noted only that we are in opposition. This was the brief commentary of SDS leader Ivan Kostov after the meeting.

DPS leader Ahmed Dogan said it is too early to say whether this opposition will be united. However, he assessed as an important political indication the fact that for the first time since the end of 1992, the leaderships of the SDS and the DPS are meeting.

According to Dogan, it would be politically a correct step if the caretaker cabinet were to report on its activity. However, the decision as to whether it should do so must be adopted by the cabinet itself. At this stage Mr. Dogan does not think a meeting with President Zhelev is necessary. This is what he told journalists after his meeting with Ivan Kostov.

Paper To Cease Publication 'Temporarily'

AU0501132595

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian on 31 December carries on its first page a 600-word editorial entitled "So Long, But Not Goodbye!" Noting "the general sharp fall in the numbers of subscribers to Bulgarian newspapers," the editorial regrets that the support of its readership, on which the paper totally relies to finance publication, "at this moment is insufficient to publish a daily newspaper." "This is why," the editorial continues, "with painful hearts we have to announce the decision that has been forced upon us to temporarily cease publication of the daily NOVINI."

The editorial then states that "preliminary preparations have already been completed to publish a weekly newspaper with reviews and commentaries that we hope will be interesting, which will succeed NOVINI within a few weeks." The editorial confirms that present subscribers "will, of course, automatically receive the new publication."

Zhelev, Officials Discuss Border Protection

AU0501180295 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the suggestion of Interior Minister Chavdar Chervenkov, a working conference was held in President Zhelev's offices to discuss issues relating to border protection. Those attending included Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova; Deputy Prime Minister Ivaylo Trifonov; Defense Minister Boyko Noev; General Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff; Gen. Bakavliev, Interior Ministry secretary; representatives of the military; and Rumen Danov, presidential adviser on national security issues.

Colonel Georgi Dimitrov, chief of the Border Troops, proposed changes in the existing system of border protection. The meeting accepted Gen. Totomirov's suggestion that the Navy play an enhanced role in protecting the marine border. The participants all agreed that border control should be strengthened and that effective legal documents should be drafted for imposing severe penalties on those who violate our borders.

Transport Minister To Dismiss Roads Chief

AU0501192495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The minister of transport is to dismiss Dimitur Dimov, chief of the Main Roads Administration, because of the failure to prepare the Bulgarian road system for the winter. In Minister Milko Kovachev's words, due to the lack of the necessary equipment the general situation is disastrous, and the person who permitted this cannot be allowed to escape punishment.

At a news briefing at the Transport Ministry it was further stated that an audit check carried out at the Main Roads Administration revealed a number of violations: misuse of funds, low standards of control, circumvention of the competent organs, and so on. These offenses provide the basis for preferring charges. According to the transport minister, to ensure that the system operates properly, the ministry will seek a new chief, who will take up his post immediately.

Commentary Criticizes Country's Balkan Policy

AU0501152695 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 29 Dec 94 p 6

[Commentary by Aleksandur Strezov: "Bulgarian Foreign Policy Must Seriously Change"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We should hardly be astonished by the fact that Ivan (John) Stanchov, foreign minister in the caretaker cabinet, repeatedly expressed his admiration for Bulgaria's foreign policy, particularly, its Balkan policy. This undoubtedly educated and charming man does not have the slightest idea about foreign policy. Evil slanderers claim that he still cannot distinguish between the European Union and the Council of Europe.

How is such a man supposed to understand that our Balkan policy is more than tragic? The only positive element in this policy is the position that we must not interfere in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. However, this did not prevent Filip Dimitrov calling for air

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strikes against the Serbs in Bosnia. It also did not prevent President Zhelev from calling the Serbs fascists. The political-ideological preferences of various individuals, regardless of how high their position in the state hierarchy, cannot prevail over the national interests.

Indeed, sooner or later it would be, precisely, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] that would prove to be the greatest failure, up to now, in Bulgaria's Balkan policy. The war will end and the time of normal relations will come. Then, Athens and Bucharest will reap the dividends of their wisdom not to stop for even a moment their relations with Belgrade, while we pretended that Serbia does not exist. The fact that FRY President Zoran Lilic made a stopover in Sofia twice and not a single mid-level official was sent to talk to him is a "minor" indication of our policy.

Actually, what did we achieve with Turkey over the past five years? The irritating factor in our relations had been eliminated already at the beginning of that period, and I do not see why we continue to have a guilt complex. It even became necessary for the Turks to block the insane idea to form a joint brigade, conceived by a "noted" Atlantic figure, and officially proposed to the minister of defense, without being authorized by anyone.

Our policy toward Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] was a total fiasco. Let us ignore the issue of whether or not we should have been the first to recognize the new republic. However, after we did this, the elementary requirement was to reap all the benefits from this act. We said "a," and did not continue with "b." No diplomatic relations were established and no ambassador was sent. Had we done so, now our ambassador would have been the doyen in Skopje. Except for the ridiculous language dispute, we did not make the Macedonians understand that if they want good relations with us they must treat us with the proper respect. The clogged border with Macedonia is indicative of the situation into which we maneuvered ourselves. It is as if despite the Greek blockade of Skopje, it is Bulgaria who should beg Macedonia to allow the orderly and peaceful crossing of the border.

Who will be held responsible for the total failure of our policy toward Greece? Five years ago Bulgaria had excellent relations with our southern neighbor. Now relations are more or less like our relations with San Marino. It is only because of Greek initiative that Greek companies are in the first place in anything related to capital investments in Bulgaria.

And why do we regard the Romanians with defiance? Iliescu's brief visit has not erased this impression. Is it not clear that in many respects even the European institutions prefer Romania to Bulgaria? Perhaps certain people have forgotten that Bucharest signed the agreement on association in the European Union long before Bulgaria?

Let us say no more about Bulgaria's Balkan policy.

Since so much has been said about Bulgaria's "isolation" before 10 November 1989, let the "critics" make the effort and check how many heads of state, prime ministers, and foreign ministers used to visit Bulgaria every year prior to this date. The average number was 20. Visits abroad do not indicate anything special. If you are insistent, finally you will be allowed to visit. However, visits to Bulgaria imply the degree of importance attributed to our country. State visits to Bulgaria in recent years can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Furthermore, is it clear with what country, why, how, and to what extent we would develop relations? Now everything is being done on the basis of grand improvisation, which to a large extent is the result of having destroyed Bulgaria's foreign policy and foreign economic services, not to mention Bulgaria's intelligence services. Will anyone be held responsible for this?

This destruction was carried out with the president's participation. Furthermore, sticking punctiliously to the letter of the Constitution, he even created his own ambassadorial nomenklatura. The criteria are personal loyalty and congeniality—and that is all. Nothing else is required. Is the president in a position to assess the qualities of the ambassadors, after he himself, despite his great claims, has demonstrated very modest knowledge in foreign policy issues? It suffices to recall his exclamation "Thank God we do not have a common border with Russia," and the ridiculous thoughts he expressed in Aachen regarding different speeds of European unification, to understand that he simply has no idea what it's all about.

If we continue, from the president down, to review the politicians and their attempts to try their luck in the realm of foreign policy, we could mention Filip Dimitrov (the only prime minister to visit the Golan Heights—something that cost us our relations with the Arab countries), Stoyan Ganev (a champion in destroying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the intelligence service, who wanted to organize a trial against the USSR), Aleksandur Yordanov (with his myriad florid statements regarding many countries), Asparukh Panov, Luchezar Toshev, and others.

Bulgaria destroyed its foreign policy and foreign economic relations without creating new ones. The future cabinet will face the task of creating systems for developing such relations, and establishing priorities. The EU should undoubtedly be the first priority. It is necessary to establish a certain order in our relations with the great states. This means that we must improve our relations with Russia (without falling on Russia's neck) and Germany (because relations with this country could be better), and continue to develop relations with France, the UK, the United States, Japan, and China. Let us study the example of the only superpower, which continuously applies pressure to poor Cuba but at the same time is muting its anti-China trumpet.

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Dispute Over Klaus's Privatization 'Intervention'

AU0501152395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 29 December on page 1 carries a 650-word "il"-signed article entitled "Klaus Interfered in Privatization of Petrof State Enterprise." The article alleges that, in a letter sent to Privatization Minister Jiri Skalicky in July 1994, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus tried to change the method of privatizing the Petrof state enterprise, a piano manufacturer based at Hradec Kralove. On 30 December, Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech and Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech publish reactions by Martin Kocourek, the prime minister's adviser, and by Prime Minister Klaus himself to the LIDOVE NOVINY allegations.

According to the LIDOVE NOVINY article of 29 December, in his letter to Skalicky, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus recommended the approval of privatization project number 2030, under which three of the five Petrof plants were to be sold to the IFM Piana company. Project number 2030 had supposedly been submitted by Jiri Seidl, a member of the current Petrof management. As the newspaper observes, the annual report on the 1993 management of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), of which Vaclav Klaus is chairman, lists the Petrof state enterprise among the party's sponsors.

Because the Privatization Ministry rejected Klaus's "recommendation" and continued to back the privatization project submitted by the Petrof family, heirs to the firm's founder, the article continues, on 9 September 1994 Martin Kocourek, the prime minister's adviser, sent another letter to Deputy Privatization Minister Michal Soukup. In this letter, a facsimile of which is reproduced by LIDOVE NOVINY on page 16, Kocourek again recommends, "upon authorization from the prime minister," the privatization project originally proposed by Klaus because "it solves the privatization of Petrof in a comprehensive manner."

According to the LIDOVE NOVINY article, in defiance of the two interventions from the prime minister's office, the Privatization Ministry continued to back the Petrof family's privatization project. The article continues: "However, on 21 December 1994, the Cabinet turned down the Petrof family's project. After a long debate and repeated voting, all ministers for the ODS (10 out of 19) voted against it. According to Minister of Transportation Jan Strasky, the main reason was the fact that the Petrof family had asked for eight years to repay the purchasing price, which the ODS ministers saw as a 'nonstandard' method." Ultimately, the Cabinet reportedly decided that Petrof, whose value is more than 500 million korunas, would be transformed into a joint-stock company, 4.23 percent of whose shares would be restituted to the Petrof family and the remaining 95.77 percent retained by the National Property Fund (FNM) for sale at a later date. Commenting on the government decision, Jan Petrof, of the family of the company's original owners, reportedly complained to LIDOVE NOVINY that the Petrofs do not have money to buy the shares from the FNM and that banks are reluctant to lend money for share purchases. He therefore expects that "in the end, communists will buy the firm."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 30 December on page 1 carries a 500-word "il"-signed report entitled "Prime Minister's Adviser Supposedly Did Not Know That the Petrof State Enterprise Sponsored the ODS in 1993." The report, which reviews the events preceding the government's ruling on the privatization of the Petrof state enterprise, quotes Martin Kocourek, Vaclav Klaus's adviser for privatization issues, as having told the daily that he did not know that Petrof, the privatization of which he tried to influence, had sponsored the ODS in 1993. On the same day, on page 16, LIDOVE NOVINY carries a 500-word "Statement by the Office of the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic on the Article 'Klaus Interfered in Privatization of Petrof State Enterprise,' Published in the Daily LIDOVE NOVINY on 29 December 1994." In the statement, which is signed by Klaus's adviser Martin Kocourek, the prime minister's office states that Vaclav Klaus is a legitimate member of the governmental privatization commission and, as such, has the right and duty to deliver his opinion on individual privatization projects. The statement qualifies LIDOVE NOVINY's article as a "profound error, arising either from the intention to scandalize something at any price, from ignorance of the privatization rules, or from mere stupidity."

The controversy over Klaus's "intervention" in the privatization of the Petrof piano maker is also touched upon in Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's regular weekly interviews, published in Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 30 December on pages 1 and 3 and Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech on 30 December on page 3. In both interviews, the places and dates of which are not given, Klaus concedes that the LIDOVE NOVINY article "upset" him. He stresses that he himself, or his office, have addressed "dozens or perhaps hundreds" such letters to the governmental privatization commission over the past two and a half years and that "taking one of these letters and starting to play some political game with it is absolutely unfair." According to Klaus, if LIDOVE NOVINY is interested in publishing his or his office's opinions on individual privatization projects on a regular basis, he is ready to supply them. He only asks the paper "not to draw any false conclusions" from them.

Minister Describes Military Strategy Document

AU0501152495 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 29 Dec 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Vilem Holan by Miroslav Korecky, place and date not given: "The Czech Republic Does Not Feel Threatened by Anyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A document entitled "Military Strategy of the Czech Republic," which the government*

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discussed and approved last week, is the first significant material the department of defense submitted to the Cabinet since the departure of Minister Baudys. New Minister Vilem Holan elucidated for us this fundamental Army document.

"The main principle of the military strategy of the Czech Republic is that our Army must be able to face danger on its own. Nevertheless, we know that problems may be vast, and such a small Army has its limits. In such an event, we must depend on an alliance protection," Defense Minister Vilem Holan characterizes his material on military strategy. "Another reason for forming alliances is that, in addition to our identity, we perceive the West European identity, of which we are a part. If we perceive such an identity, we also yearn for responsibility within NATO for the defense of the entire alliance."

[Korecky] Where does the government see the main risks for the security of our country?

[Holan] The document approved by the government consists of two parts—a doctrinal one and a conceptual one. The former deals with the conceivable risks. They are the risks resulting from the social and economic conditions in some parts of the world. They are defined in only a very abstract form—namely, we do not feel that the Czech Republic faces any immediate threats. Under no circumstances are there any global dangers—if at all, then local ones. Such a danger may arise from the migration waves, for instance, caused by local conflicts, from terrorism, drug distribution, etc. We definitely rule out any threat from the neighbors.

[Korecky] What is the basis of the actual military strategy?

[Holan] The strategy is based precisely on the outline of conceivable risks. The Republic must be prepared for dangers proportionately to the size of its territory and to the size of the armies of the neighboring countries. Because of the good relations with the neighbors, however, we do not need an army ready for an immediate attack. Moreover, it declares that the Czech Republic will honor all treaties it has signed and that talks are its main method.

[Korecky] How does the document characterize our Army?

[Holan] It describes the entire structure of our Armed Forces. The Army should be nonpartisan, at this time semiprofessional, equipped with convention but technically accomplished weapons. It is emphasized here that the Armed Forces are subject to public and parliamentary control.

[Korecky] So, the military strategy does not yet reckon with the full professionalization of the Army?

[Holan] This material is an outline to 2005. We expect that, until then, the Army will be semiprofessional. The reasons for it are mostly of an economic nature. Nevertheless, it is possible that the reasons will prevail of the type that it will not be possible to master the complex technology of the weapons system during the compulsory conscription service. This fact usually leads the states to professionalizing their armies.

Oil Supplies Halted Since 1 Jan

AU0501131995 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 4 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by "kor": "Oil Supplies to the Czech Republic Have Been Halted"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague—Oil supplies to the Czech Republic have been halted since 1 January, Jana Hejskova, head of the department for crude oil imports in the Chemapol state enterprise, told RUDE PRAVO.

According to Hejskova, supplies to Budkovce [town on the Slovak-Ukrainian border] in Slovakia were already halted on 31 December, and the next day the Slovak Transpetrol company had to halt the supply to the Czech Republic. Supplies to Hungary have been halted as well. The refinery of the Kaucuk Kralupy company has crude oil reserves for more than 10 days, according to Hejskova, and Chemapetrol Litvinov's refinery's crude oil in stock will last about four days. [passage omitted] State contingency reserves amount to about 100,000 metric tons, but Chemapol expects that oil imports will be resumed within three days.

According to Jana Hejskova, one of the possible reasons for the interruption in deliveries is the New Year's holiday, which may have prevented the timely processing of customs modalities. Another and, in Hejskova's opinion, more important reason is the increase of the transit fee in Ukraine. Deliveries to Poland and the east German refineries via Belarus have been reduced but not halted, she said.

According to unofficial reports, the increase in Ukrainian transit fees will raise the price of crude oil imported to the Czech Republic by 15 cents per barrel.

Statement by Chancellor Kohl Sparks Discussion

95CH0074D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 6 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by Victor Gomez: "Czechs Surprised as Kohl Prefers Poles"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Czech officials reacted diplomatically to a statement made by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that casts Poland as Germany's most favored nation for integration into the European Union.

Members of the government—who have prided themselves on the Czech Republic having some of the strongest macroeconomic indicators in the region—were clearly surprised by Kohl's Nov. 23 comments.

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In his first major policy speech since his party won national elections earlier this year, Kohl said it is in the best interest of Germany and Europe to make Poland a priority candidate for membership in the EU.

Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said he would like to see a copy of Kohl's speech before reacting to it, but he did venture a few words on its potential relevance.

"I think that Chancellor Kohl was stressing Poland's exceptional position and size in this connection," he said. "If it were to be an indication of some sort of change of position by the Bonn government toward the Czech Republic, it would of course be very, very unpleasant information. However, I am not drawing this conclusion."

Others said it makes perfect sense for Germany to make Poland's integration a top priority. They also shared Klaus' view that the statement itself will have little impact.

Zbigniew Levicki, director at the Institute for East-West Studies, said the comments are not likely to have much impact in the long term. "It may be a blow in terms of propaganda, but not in a real sense," he said.

He said Kohl's words were likely just a reflection of the political and economic importance of Poland, a country of 38 million people. This view was echoed by other analysts, who said the Czech Republic would probably maintain standard relations with Germany.

"As far as I know, the Czech diplomatic corps is not doing anything about this speech, although they are probably not extremely happy about it," said Jiri Pesek, a professor at the Charles University Institute for International Studies.

Jan Mladek, an economist who works for the Ministry of Trade and Industry, said stability in Poland is also in the Czech Republic's interest. "Poland is, of course, the largest (country in Central Europe) and the most problematic from the point of view of being accepted (into the EU)," he said.

Erik Jones, a European-studies lecturer at Central European University in Prague, stressed that the EU generally accepts new countries in waves. "The EU enlargement is not a horse race.... They are likely to take one country ahead of another," he said.

But Levicki added a word of warning for Klaus, who is perceived by many observers to be turning EU accession into a race among Central European countries. "Prime Minister Klaus talks about the Czech Republic being No. 1 (in the region)...and the response to such claims abroad is sometimes amusement, sometimes irritation."

Jones said Kohl's comments were probably sparked by "the huge volume" of legal and illegal trade between Poland and Germany, as well as an attempt to stabilize relations between the two countries. "The level of (trade between Germany and Poland) now is excessive. It's huge," he said.

Mladek's said political stability in Poland is a top priority for the whole region, not just Germany. "When Germany begins to pay more attention to (good relations) with Poland, there will be more quiet around here."

In addition to this, Pesek said today's Germans still have something of a guilt complex for the actions of their predecessors in Poland. "Germany is very aware of the massacre of 1 million Poles during the Second World War," said Pesek. "In comparison...what (the Germans) did to the Czechs isn't so significant."

But in Germany, Rudolf Scharping, leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party, blasted Kohl for neglecting to mention the importance of the Czech Republic, as well as Slovakia and Hungary.

Without these countries, Scharping said, Europe would not be complete.

No Great Surprises in Local Elections

95CH0074E Prague PRAGUE POST in English 6 Dec 94 p 11

[Commentary by Daniel Kumermann, on the foreign desk at LIDOVE NOVINY: "Election Winners Can Be Losers Too"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] It took about three days to count the votes and announce the new members of all the local councils. It will take much longer to count the various assessments of what the results of the Nov. 18-19 municipal elections tell us about the current state of the Czech political scene.

Some two-thirds of eligible voters cast their ballots. While this is not any less than the turnout in a country with a developed democratic system, it is markedly less than expected, considering that for most voters it was just the second chance of their lives to freely choose who would care for their local affairs—issues that are often in greater disarray than the nationwide ones.

There are two explanations for this situation. According to the first, the electorate trusts its representatives so much that it feels no need to participate in the elections. The other says the electorate is so upset, frustrated and resigned that it just ignores the vote.

But almost all the analysts can agree on who won and who lost—and who did both.

The major representative of the latter group is the Czech Republic's most popular political party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). It won in the larger cities, where the electorate decided mostly along party lines and where people have profited most from the changes of the last five years. At the same time, it lost in the countryside—

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rural people bear the brunt of the problems that economic transformation brings. They also do not trust the newly rising "political elite," as they can often remember what the same people's party allegiances were but five years ago.

That could be one of the reasons so many communists did well in rural areas: People appreciate that they did not turn their coats and that they have stuck to their party colors (however stupid). When we add the traditional communist network that, though torn, still survives, we get quite a large pool of voters who most probably still espouse the old discipline from times when each "demonstrative ballot for our happy future" produced a 99.9 percent "yes" vote.

The other major member of the loser-winner category is the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL), which lost the cities but made up for it in the smaller places, especially in its traditional stronghold of southern Moravia. The structures it had built under communism came in very handy. All it asked was for voters to get rid of the old habit of claiming allegiance to Big Brother every now and then and bring in a new fashion of briefly standing up to the (new) Big Brother.

"The true winner of the 1994 elections was the independent candidate," goes the official proclamation. But how to define and grasp the independent-candidate phenomenon? Most probably, it is the person who wants to participate in public affairs and does not find any trustworthy party in which to do so. No wonder most of the parties agreed on open dislike of the independents. Who knows, maybe that was the true reason behind their success. And that tells us more about the state of mind of the voter than about the real success of the candidate.

In practical terms, the victory of independence may represent future trouble. The state of local affairs often demands concentrated effort, and the goulash of independence may rule out consensus.

On the other end of the spectrum, the least-losing loser was the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). All it lost was the hope that these elections would prove the party stronger than its representation in parliament shows. Given the kind of party structure the ODA has built—based on city intelligentsia—it did not stand a chance anyway. So, sooner or later, it may happily return to the old dreams.

The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) was the true disappointment of these elections. Almost everybody in this country agrees it is the social democrats' task to build a reasonable and reliable opposition to take over when the current political leadership grows tired and immobile. It will, of course, take more in-depth analysis to find out why, of the parties of the left, the social democrats ended behind the communists. Many hopes were pinned on them, as the ruling coalition is getting old, senile and corrupt long before its time and there is virtually nobody to replace it.

Two small successes to end with: Jiri Dienstbier's Free Democrats (SD) became a distinctly urban party, scoring only in a few larger cities. They once seemed completely lost, but now, with a fresh injection of support, they may try to go on in politics.

The last is the Democratic Union (DU), which has existed but a short time yet still generated a bit of success. So far, the DU has built on just one issue—criticism of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus from the right. It is impossible to say whether the union will be able to build on its positive entry to the political scene.

As the election dust settled, there were no colossal surprises. The Czech political scene is as immature as ever, and there are few signs as to what turn it will eventually take. Still, there may be a few surprises ahead.

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French Assured Nuclear Station To Be Completed

LD0501222995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Michel Perrin, the French ambassador to Slovakia, visited the Mochovce nuclear power station today. He was accompanied by a group of experts from Electricite de France, the French power company, which is participating in the final preparations for the completion and putting into operation of the power station.

Slovakia requires a loan of approximately 1.4 billion Germam marks from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the completion of the first two blocks. The bank's board of directors will discuss the loan in March.

French Ambassador Michel Perrin expressed the hope that the political changes in Slovakia since the parliamentary elections would not influence the completion of the Mochovce project. A representative of our Ministry of Economy, Imrich Szitas, assured him of the Slovak Government's irreversible decision to complete this important energy project.

Political Scientist Surveys Current Issues

95CH0054A Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak 10 Nov 94 p 8

[Article by Stefan Sugar: "How to Step Out of Your Shadow; French Political Scientist Jacque Rupnik Advises Slovak Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A look at the domestic political scene from the outside is always useful, especially if the looking is done by such an erudite and recognized political scientist as Jacques Rupnik. His analyses are perceptive, precise, and unbiased. During his stay in Bratislava, he may even have disappointed some of his friends who expected him to agree with their assessment of the election results to the Slovak Republic National Council [NR SR].

Jacques Rupnik does not fault the voters so much as he does the politicians of the governing coalition. In his opinion, since March 1994, the strategy of the opposition, which banded together to overthrow Meciar, has not always been comprehensible. Jacques Rupnik posed the question whether it was not a premature move, whether the opposition politicians should not have waited longer so that Meciar would "stew in his own juice." But, if they already made that move, they either should have called the early elections immediately, or, alternately, they should have given themselves a longer time horizon, which would have enabled them to prove that they can carry out successful policies. The results of the elections give the impression that they lost on both counts.

Jacques Rupnik also voiced criticism of the unsuccessful social-democratization of the former communists. He allowed that it is quite shocking how the communists first banned the social democrats and then stole their name. For the present, however, it is important that the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] did not succeed in creating a trio with Poland and Hungary, where communists in a shockingly brief time returned to political power, even though, according to Rupnik, only the communists returned and not communism, and what is important is not what they did in the past but what they are doing today. In other words, it is possible to get along even with communists as long as they pursue the same course in the economic transformation as the noncommunist political parties would.

After Meciar's victory in the elections, the alarm went up here that Slovakia's participation in the Visegrad Four is in jeopardy. According to Rupnik, however, Slovakia holds a key position in that group because it borders on all of those countries, and, without it, the existence of the Visegrad Four would become groundless. And finally, other than Poland, nobody is pushing the Visegrad Four much any more. Other members give preference to joining the EU along their own axis. Some Czech politicians would like to replace Slovakia with Slovenia on the way to the EU and suggest that the first group extending the EU toward the east include the Czech Republic, Austria, and Slovenia. Only in the second group should such candidates for membership as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia be. However, Slovakia faces a realistic danger, as Jacques Rupnik said, that it will drop out of the present model of Central European countries and thus find itself in the group of countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. We do not have to doubt that in some former brotherly countries they would greet this with malicious satisfaction.

Jacque Ripnik conceded that not all countries reacted the same way to Meciar's victory. For example, in the Czech Republic, they felt relief because it justified the course of action taken by those who were instrumental in dividing the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic]. The reaction was different in Budapest, which would like to have worked with the non-Meciar coalition because it was doing its best to accommodate the demands of the Hungarian national minority. What bothers Rupnik the most about Meciar is that, as the leader of the victorious movement, he is in no hurry to govern, and the leader of the Slovak Workers' Union, Jan Luptak, does not want to govern at all. According to Rupnik, the conditions in the individual countries of the Visegrad Four became so different that cooperation in formulating common strategy in relation to the EU is almost out of the question, and, therefore, each county must choose its own strategy and course of action. But the member countries as a body could push through much more in negotiations than when they negotiate conditions separately.

What does Jacques Rupnik advise Slovakia to do in this situation? His advice is for Slovak politicians to behave even now as future Europeans. In practice, this means,

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for example, that, in passing legislation, Slovakia will respect European norms. Above all, however, it is essential to adjust to the demanding conditions of the Common Market.

The countries of the Visegrad Four must look at themselves through the eyes of the EU, which has had unpleasant experience with Greece. It is necessary to realize that the EU will not accept into its ranks countries that, for example, have not resolved the issue of their national minorities and that would bring into the EU their old conflicts. Our acceptance into the EU will therefore be decided by ourselves, by our political culture, stability, and economic efficiency. "The attitude of the West toward the Slovak Republic," emphasized Rupnik, "is merely a reaction to our internal political and economic developments."

What was appreciated about Rupnik's analysis was the fact that he expressed criticism equally of the Central European countries and the EU countries. He is concerned about the political developments in Austria, Italy, and Belgium. In his opinion, there is a widening gulf between the society and the political system, between the citizen and his representatives. "We are at a crossroads," said Rupnik. "Either the democratic integration will move from the West in the direction of Central and East Europe, and such a development could be a positive example for other countries, or developments will take an opposite turn and nationalism or populism will march from the East to the West."

Contradictions in Luptak's Views Detected

95CH0054B Bratislava SLOBODNY PIATOK in Slovak 24 Nov 94 p 10

[Commentary by Ivo Crycz: "Do As He Says, Not As He Does"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia has a new national hero. It created him without any effort on his part. He merely explained to people in more comprehensible terms the "antipeople nature" of the economic transformation and set up a class confrontation between workers as the oppressed and all post-November reformers as the oppressors. We all know his name. But is it really that Jan Lupak who in the parliament represents the workers and pillories the powerful? The head of the Workers Union criticized the perquisites of the powerful. But he did not take the opportunity during the "night of long faces" to put forth an initiative to cut the pay and other benefits of the deputies. He himself is already riding around in a Western BMW, and, if he lasts four years in the parliament, he will make about 2 million korunas. Jan Lupak only wanted to control power; well, in the agreement with the victor in the elections, he committed himself to cooperation in the parliament, which he has clearly demonstrated by the way he voted. As a reward, he was named deputy prime minister; he did not want to let his former colleague Lubomir Fogas, who brought extensive experience from the European Parliament, have that position. He also rejected important control mechanisms—proportionate representation of chairmen and members of parlimentary committees. In his preelection speeches, Luptak also denounced corruption and nepotism. Well, as soon as the first filling of positions was under way, he used that opportunity to place his sister-in-law on the television council. In a word, today the leader of the workers represents those whom he used to criticize. And that is, strangely enough, a good thing because he freed his voters from illusions about some different, worker-oriented politics. By his own actions he proclaimed himself a fake. By the way, those who voted for Luptak's party were overwhelmingly the unemployed and the less-skilled workers from spheres that represent only about a 10-percent share of Slovakia's GDP.

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View on Talks With Romania on Minority Issue

LD0501173595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1930 GMT 4 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Negotiations about the way in which the Hungarian minority's situation in Romania could be improved will continue in Budapest in January. Laszlo Baranyai learned this from Csaba Tabajdi, state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office, in Timisoara after the state secretary, together with Laszlo Labodi, chairman of the Office of Hungarians beyond the Borders, met Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu and Oliviu Gherman, the chairman of the Romanian Senate, as well as Viorel Hrebenciuc, the coordinator of the Romanian National Minorities Council.

[Begin recording] [Baranyai] What subjects did you discuss in Bucharest with your Romanian negotiating partners, and with what success?

[Tabajdi] In a sense, these negotiations in Bucharest have been special in the context of Hungarian-Romanian relations because before this, there was no precedent of the official responsible for minority affairs in the Hungarian Government and the chairman of Hungary's Office of Hungarians Beyond The Borders holding negotiations with the Romanian partners precisely about these subjects. [passage omitted]

During the negotiations we reviewed in detail the draft education law that has already been submitted to the Romanian Senate. This law raises several problems, because the draft contains constraints on the minorities' vocational training and higher education. It gives rise to anxiety that the draft does not ensure the teaching of history and geography in the mother language. Senate President Oliviu Gherman promised that he would even use his personal influence to ensure that the bill is adopted in a form fundamentally suitable to the minorities' requirements.

Referring to the delay in submitting the draft minority law, also raised during the talks, the Romanian side explained that it was caused by delays in the preparatory work. I also raised the issue of releasing Pal Csheresznyes. I also urged the implementation of expectations, which were even formulated by the Council of Europe at the time of Romania's application for membership; for example, the return of church properties to their original owners.

We also discussed the discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Romania which, according to our information, is taking place in the course of privatization. [passage omitted]

We agreed with Mr. Hrebenciuc that we will continue talks in Budapest in January. [passage omitted] What I consider to be one of the most important elements in breaking the deadlock is that Mr. Hrebenciuc did not rule out the involvement of the representatives of the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania and the Federation of Romanians in Hungary in a certain phase of the negotiations in Budapest.

In negotiations with Mr. Melescanu we urged that, alongside the Hungarian-Romanian Treaty, we should draft a minority protection agreement or convention, and that we should establish a Hungarian-Romanian mixed committee for minorities.

[Baranyai] Did the Romanian side accept the request that a separate agreement, linked to the treaty, should guarantee the rights of national minorities?

[Tabajdi] Minister Melescanu did not rule this out. [passage omitted]

Envoy on OSCE Mediation in Chechen Crisis

LD0501194795 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary, which is chairing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], will send a special envoy to Moscow next week, to discuss a solution to the Chechen conflict. The OSCE is of the view that the crisis threatens the security not only of the Russian federation, but also of the region and the continent.

Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati told Newsreel [this program] that the principles of the OSCE must be enforced in resolving the Chechen crisis, but without casting doubt on the fact that Chechnya is part of Russia.

[Unidentified correspondent] The mediation mission of the OSCE could succeed if the Russian Government was willing to accept diplomatic assistance. According to Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, the OSCE could be the organization that mediated successfully in the Chechen-Russian conflict.

[Begin Gyarmati recording] The UN and the European Union, as well as the most important countries, have directly or indirectly approached us and expressed the hope that the chairman would lead the OSCE successfully in this crisis, since no other organization is willing or able to deal with it. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The next few days timetable has been prepared.

[Begin Gyarmati recording] We will try to work out some plan of what we should tell Russia, what we should propose. Obviously, they in Moscow are doing the same. We will try to reconcile these on Monday-Tuesday of next week [9-10 January], and then we will present a package of proposals to the OSCE Standing Council.

Official Views Conditions of EU Membership

AU0501131895 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 30 Dec 94 p 9

[Interview with Endre Juhasz, state secretary at the Industry and Trade Ministry and chairman of the Office of European Affairs, by Laszlo Meszleny; place and date not given: "Detailed Work Is Coming Next—Endre Juhasz on the Rejected Loan Application, Customs, and Chances of EU Membership"]

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Meszleny] What specific economic effects will our associate membership with the European Union [EU] have in the coming years?

[Juhasz] According to the association agreement, the removal of trade barriers in the case of industrial products is continuous. Very important measures will come into force on 1 January 1995 because, for example, customs duty on all Hungarian industrial exports except for steel and textile products will be abolished. Up to now, some 94 categories of products have not been completely duty-free and so-called customs ceilings and quotas have existed. These included Hungarian car and bus manufacturing, chemical industry products, lightbulbs, and light industrial products. The duty on steel products will be negligible, generally less than 1 percent. In the case of textile products—where work under commission agreement continues to be duty free—the duties will be reduced to three-sevenths of the original level which means an average 5 to 6 percent customs duty. The duty on steel products will be reduced to zero at the end of 1995 and on textiles at the end of 1996. On 1 January 1995, Hungary will take important steps as regards imports because we will also begin to remove the duties on the "sensitive products." In the association agreement, we only accepted the obligation to make 25 percent of the industrial imports duty free in the first years. We will now begin to remove the duties in the remaining section, in two groups. From 1995, we will reduce the duties by one third in the case of those products where we accepted to implement fast reduction of duties, and a 10 percent reduction will be implemented in the case of sensitive products.

[Meszleny] What are considered to be sensitive products for Hungary?

[Juhasz] Products that are sensitive in the EU are also sensitive for Hungary, but our range of products is much wider. These include many products in addition to steel and textile products, transport vehicles, and chemical industry products. Unlike the previous sections of the association agreement, the current duty reductions affect all products and they only differ in degree. They will be reduced to zero in three stages in the case of less problematic products, and the removal of duties will be completed by 2001 in the case of the other products.

[Meszleny] However, the trade of agricultural products seems more complicated....

[Juhasz] The situation is different here, we did not prescribe completely free trade in the association agreement, rather, we granted mutual advantages to each other. A new situation has arisen in the case of agricultural products because, as a result of the Uruguay Round, customs duties were introduced on both sides in place of the EU's levying and Hungarian licensing procedure which are considered to be market protection tools. Agricultural foreign trade will be more liberalized but at a higher customs duty level. We will grant quotas to each other from these higher duties to reflect the preferential aspects of the association membership. Hungary will grant these preferences to the EU in an autonomous way from 1 January. [passage omitted]

[Meszleny] Can you sense the strengthening of the "bloc view" in the EU?

[Juhasz] This does and does not exist. The strategy of catching up was drawn up for the six associated countries. Work is under way on the White Paper that will contain the requirements of the unified market, mainly the technical conditions, in a unified way for the six countries. However, all this will not prevent drawing up a national strategy and the EU also agrees with this. Unified documents will exist but the implementation, for example, of the White Book will depend on us. Agreement also exists in that talks on the accession will be conducted separately and, naturally, the performances will be assessed individually. However, until then, many elements will reflect a bloc view. In the framework of the so-called structured system of relations, the foreign ministers and ministers of specific areas are invited together. At the same time, bilateral forums also exist, for example the association council or the association committee where only bilateral issues are discussed. Multilateral and bilateral contacts will continue to exist together for a long time, and the Hungarian side would certainly oppose the suppression of bilateral contacts. At the same time, certain problems cannot be discussed at six different meetings for technical reasons alone. [passage omitted]

[Meszleny] Is it desirable to change the emphases in the Hungarian accession policy in the coming years?

[Juhasz] Time has come for detailed work. The major political steps have already been taken. We submitted the application for membership, this has been acknowledged, the process has started. The Essen summit approved the strategic document. It is impossible to achieve full EU membership with spectacular measures, the country has to concentrate on extensively fulfilling the criteria. In the interest of this, the association agreement will have to be implemented by the year 2001 in accordance with the clear schedule, even if some steps might be painful. We have to strive to integrate the agriculture, however, this requires efforts on both sides. Contrary to industry, regarding agriculture, we did not receive precise guidelines on what we need to adjust to. The Union's agricultural policy is also facing reforms and the situation will be different by 1999 or 2000 when we become a member. This is one of the most critical areas because the dilemma is whether we should follow the Union's agricultural policy or prepare for a system based on the world market, or perhaps for something between the two. We have to continue legal harmonization in the areas of parliamentary legislation and lower level rules, standards, and technical requirements. We have to adopt more than 1,000 environmental, health, life protection, and energy rationalization regulations. All these will be included in the White Paper but we must not wait until it is completed probably in six months' time. Approaching the Maastricht criteria assumes that we reduce inflation, interests rates on loans, and the budget deficit, and at least reduce the speed of the state debt's increase. If we make continuous progress in all areas then our chances are not bad.

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Repercussions of Pawlak-Olechowski Dispute

LD0501220995 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2000 GMT 5 Jan 95

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak has agreed to a two-week period of leave for the foreign minister. In a letter to Andrzej Olechowski, the prime minister expressed the hope that, after his rest, the minister will himself finally decide whether he will remain in his post or leave. The head of our diplomacy feels the conflict between the coalition and the president is destroying the consensus around foreign policy.

In his letter to Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, Prime Minister Pawlak evaluates the substantive activity of the minister and his ministry. In the case of the general aims of our foreign policy, there was no difference between us, writes the prime minister. There are, however, natural differences of view on practical matters. Nominating you to this post, I counted on the fact that a plan will be prepared in the Foreign Ministry for the serious inclusion of the foreign service into the matters of the modernization of our economic efforts in the international system. Unfortunately, this was not done. In conclusion, Prime Minister Pawlak writes: I can accept neither your seeming resignation nor a drawn-out rest leave. I express my consent only for two weeks of leave. The head of government also wrote that he could treat the absence of the minister from work between 1 and 3 January as desertion of his post, but he is not doing this.

In a further part of the letter, the prime minister repeated the substantive accusation that had been formulated earlier in public, about the lack of support for and promotion of Polish economic interests by Andrzej Olechowski. This accusation has been received at the Foreign Ministry as being completely cockeyed and, indeed, fictitious. On the basis of the budget law for last year, the ministry had only 6,000,000,000 zlotys for promotion in any shape or form. The potentate and main promotor of Polish economic interests is the Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Abroad, which is directed by a Polish Peasant Party [PSL] member who is close to the prime minister, Leslaw Podkanski. Last year, they had 30 times more for promotional purposes, over 200,000,000,000 zlotys, says a highly placed Foreign Ministry official who wishes to maintain his anonymity. Spice is added to all of this by the fact that it is the wife of Deputy Tadeusz Samborski, of the PSL, who directs the promotion department in the Ministry for Economic Cooperation. This Samborski is the same one who took an active part in the work of the special Sejm subcommittee for the examination of personel issues in the Foreign Ministry.

Further on in the letter, Prime Minister Pawlak expressed the hope that Minister Olechowski will finally decide whether he is staying in the ministry or leaving and that he will thereby not hide behind the guarantees of the president. What guarantees of the president could Minister Olechowski hide behind, we asked Minister Falandysz of the presidential chancellery? The formulation sounds frivolous, at the least, said Lech Falandysz, and announced an official commentary to the letter of Waldemar Pawlak for tomorrow.

The prime minister personally handed his letter to Minister Olechowski just before the meeting of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission. Its chairman expressed the hope that the entire matter will quickly be clarified.

[Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission] "I would wish that, on the issue of foreign policy, there be one, homogeneous view, as between the president, the prime minister, and the minister of foreign affairs."

[Announcer] Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy feels that this is at the moment a complication for Polish affairs.

[Jozef Oleksy, Sejm speaker] "The person of the minister of foreign affairs is an important figure in the politics of the country and the image of the country. On the other hand, this is all taking place with many rough passages, on both sides, and I think that this deadline of two weeks that the prime minister indicates to Minister Olechowski indeed ought to resolve something. Things cannot be like this any longer, that a misty situation in the ministry and in foreign policy continues."

[Announcer] In the view of Minister Olechowski, the point here is the conflict between the government and parliament on the one hand and the president. A component of this is a change in the regulations while work is going on.

[Olechowski] "At the start of the functioning of this government, this was not questioned. The prerogatives of the president to nominate the three ministers were not questioned. That is, things were not this far advanced, the coalition created, the coalition after all and no-one else created this habit that the president does not just consult but nominates [sentence as heard]. On the other hand, things later started to be done differently. And this is an example. And now, no. Well, why not? Because this was apparently the agreement in the beginning, perhaps it was not down in writing, perhaps it is a little like my leave. Well, to be sure, he said so, but it was not written down, [indistinct], and this is the problem."

[Announcer] Replying to a deputy's question on the matter of the situation in Chechnya, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak among other things addressed the situation in the Foreign Ministry.

[Prime Minister Pawlak] "We expect here responsible service to the country and not participation in parlor games. Unfortunately, I am sad to say that, in this difficult situation, the minister of foreign affairs is somewhat absorbed by matters of his leave, but in a moment we will discuss the situation in the Foreign

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Ministry, and Minister Olechowski will be able to speak in detail about this matter."

[Announcer] The minister has made his resignaton dependent upon the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal that is to meet on 12 January.

Olechowski Tells Sejm: Business as Usual

LD0501162395 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1428 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 5 Jan—Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski said at a meeting of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission on 5 January that his ministry was "functioning very normally, the way it often does during the year, when the minister is absent, either traveling abroad or on leave." Olechowski added that, as a matter of routine, on such occasions his duties are taken over by an under secretary of state who is authorized to do this.

Olechowski said he decided to take leave at the beginning of January because he was convinced that, by this time, the Constitutional Tribunal would have ruled whether the inclusion of his name on the list prepared by the justice minister, accusing him of having broken the law, was justified. "If that accusation were to be confirmed, I could not continue as foreign minister or in any other political capacity. I have taken leave to await in peace the meeting of the Constitutional Tribunal. This seemed to me the best course of action, as well as the clearest, the most sensible, without disturbing the work of the ministry I am in charge of," Olechowski said.

The Sejm commission approached Waldemar Pawlak with a request for a report on the situation in the Foreign Ministry. The motion was filed by Krzysztof Kaminski, KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], and was seconded by Tadeusz Iwinski, SLD [Democratic Left Alliance]. Bronislaw Geremek, UW [Freedom Union], the commission chairman, said that the prime minister had authorized Minister Olechowski to address the commission. "It seems to me a bit odd, as well as impossible to understand, that the prime minister had decided that it was Minister Olechowski who should report on the matter involving himself and the prime minister," Krzysztof Krol, the commission deputy chairman said.

Pawlak Grants Olechowski Two Weeks of Leave

LD0501144595 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1300 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak granted Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski 14 days of leave as of 4 January.

Ewa Wachowicz, the prime minister's press secretary, said that Waldemar Pawlak sent a letter to Andrzej Olechowski. The contents of the letter are covered by the law on the confidentiality of correspondence.

[Begin Wachowicz recording] Last night, Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Council of Ministers, sent a letter to Andrzej Olechowski. The contents of the letter are confidential. You have to ask the addressee about the contents. Because of the importance of the issues contained in it, copies of the letter were given to the president, the speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, the members of the Council of Ministers, and the deputies and senators who are members of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of both houses of parliament.

For my part, I can only add that the prime minister does not accept either the pseudoresignation or a pseudo extended vacation [niby-rezygnacja, niby przewlekly urlop wypoczynkowy]. [end recording]

Russian Envoy on Near Abroad, NATO, Chechnya

WS0501131595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Jan 95 pp 10-11

[Interview with Russian Ambassador to Poland Yuriy Kashlev by Witold Beres and Krzysztof Burnetko; place and date not given: "A Chicken Is a Bird, Poland Is a Foreign Country"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [GAZETA WYBORCZA] Is the saying "A chicken is not a bird, Poland is not a foreign country" [preceding passage in quotation marks published in Russian with Polish transliteration] still popular in Russia? What does the term "near abroad" mean to the Russians?

[Kashlev] I myself used the saying in several interviews to illustrate our mentality. Throughout history, we were always, or at least often, very close. There were times when the czars ruled Poland and Poland was part of the Russian empire. That is when the saying originated—to show that Poland was a foreign land, but not quite.

Nobody uses it anymore; we consider Poland to be a sovereign state. A great one at that. How many Russians, for example, currently dream of going to Poland?! Poland is the country most frequently visited by CIS citizens—approximately 8 million people come here each year! That is more than the human traffic between Canada and the United States. In terms of politics, the economy, and culture, no one sees Poland as the near abroad any more.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] But such a term did appear in the language of politics in Russia. In Poland, it raises huge fears because people still remember what our past relations were. How would you define them?

[Kashlev] The term raises your fears because you do not know that Poland was never considered a near abroad country in Russia. The near abroad lands are the former USSR republics, which currently surround what is now the Russian Federation. The phrase is used in its historical and geographical sense—these are lands that are close to Russia both historically and geographically.

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After all, nearly 25 million Russians live outside the Federation! If you count mixed families, you will get 60-70 million people. Everything good and evil for Russia comes from there. Those countries account for 90 percent of our trade and culture but are also the cause of conflicts and wars.

Those territories are of top priority to us. We classify Poland as a state of East or East Central Europe. It comes in second place, after the near abroad countries.

Your fears of Russia are unfounded. We have signed bilateral treaties, which guarantee nonintervention, mutual respect for each other's rights, cooperation, and full sovereignty. [passage omitted]

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Can you definitely say that you rule out the possibility that certain forces or politicians may emerge on both sides—in Russia and in Poland—who will have an interest in envenoming mutual relations? Can you rule out ordinary provocation on both sides?

[Kashlev] I am afraid such forces do exist on both sides. As I work in Warsaw, I see the issue with deeper insight from the Polish perspective. There are people who do not wish to normalize or nurture our relations. Some of them do not do it out of hate for the Russians. They assume a threat from Russia is needed so that Poland can be accepted into NATO sooner. We have that in our country, too. Along with the downfall of the USSR, because a certain national pride was wounded, various dangerous, nationalist reactions were stirred up. And, if you prove that the government has no control and is unable to protect its citizens abroad. Such cases are amplified. [passage omitted]

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Some political groups in Russia object to Poland's membership in NATO. Why the doubts? What is your opinion on that?

[Kashlev] When President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyryev say they are against the expansion of NATO, neither of them makes a specific reference to Poland. We are not against Poland; we are against the expansion of NATO. If and when Poland joins NATO is an issue between Poland and NATO. It is no concern of ours. Yet we do have our own concept, which reflects our own interests. According to that concept, there is no need to form new military blocs in Europe or even maintain those that already exist. NATO was established to counterbalance communism and the Warsaw Pact. In any case, it was a pact against the Soviet Union. Now threats from the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, or communism no longer exist. For what do we need a military bloc? Why should we expand it? Why should it be expanded to border Russia? How should it be expanded? Should the Visegrad Group be admitted first, followed by, let us say, the Baltic states, and, eventually, Romania so as to form a ring around Russia? What would that cause?

Although we do acknowledge the need for NATO, our General Staff is working, the generals get paid every month, and the rockets are there. And now the Army must choose new targets for these rockets! They would have to be directed at regions of Europe at which they were never aimed.

Our generals say that, in this situation, we must reexamine the agreements on limiting conventional arms in Europe because they were signed when the Soviet Union still existed and Europe was divided. The situation is now different, the generals argue their point, so we cannot reduce conventional arms. Nether Ukraine, Belarus, nor Kazakhstan intends to join NATO, although they are also in possession of nuclear arms. On the site of the former Soviet Union we would thus have to establish a new bloc that would include four nuclear powers!

This is what Yeltsin has in mind when he says the process must be slowed down. Not halted, but slowed down for a couple of years so that time can be gained for developing a new security system for Europe on the foundations of the CSCE, NATO, CIS, and the Western European Union. We are in the initial phase of that process, which is, by the way, our major challenge for the 21st century. Still, we are well aware of the reasons the Americans want to expand NATO immediately.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Why do you think that is?

[Kashlev] First of all, they are not sure whether democracy in Russia will survive. Perhaps they are preparing themselves for the darkest scenario—that there will be no democracy in Russia. That is why we wanted to have Russia surrounded. That is why Yeltsin said in Budapest that it was premature to bury democracy in Russia. Demands for NATO expansion can help destroy democracy in Russia. This will be the main argument in the anti-Yeltsin campaign before the presidential election.

The Americans also realize that NATO needs fresh blood. NATO is not sure what it is supposed to do. It has gotten involved in Yugoslavia, for instance, and lost. They have to think of something not to lose face. Hence, the idea to expand the bloc. Thank God, however, the Budapest summit made them realize it is not that simple. The politicians came to the conclusion that the matter has to be reconsidered. I do not evaluate that meeting negatively. Certain ideological frictions did take place, but the organizational conclusions are quite good—the idea of having an organization with fixed institutions instead of conferences, increasing the role of the CSCE in peacekeeping, and so on.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The end of the year saw violent fighting in Chechnya. As do the majority of Poles, we find it disturbing that a superpower like Russia is capable of such ruthless action. We also fear that Poland may become the object of such radical measures. We would thus like to be sheltered under the umbrella of NATO, which is, as we see it, a clearly defensive pact. Do you not believe that the war in Chechnya may fuel the aspirations of Poland and Central East Europe to join NATO?

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[Kashlev] Your question does not make it clear how the issues of Chechnya, Poland, and NATO are related.

The issue of Chechnya is, as I would say, an ulcer in the organism of the Russian state that was swelling over the years and finally burst. Moscow is trying to restore constitutional order in a region where all human rights and the Constitution of our Federation are violated. It is very unfortunate that we were forced to resort to military measures and deploy soldiers and weapons.

Applying force to solve an internal problem of the Russian Federation has, in my view, nothing to do with the reasons and timetables of Poland's joining NATO. It is as if you suddenly decided to join the army just because your neighbor's family began to quarrel. Imagine what would happen if, as a result of an internal conflict in one country, neighboring states quickly began forming military alliances. I believe such a union is superficial.

I wish to repeat: We strongly regret having been forced to resort to the Army, but the steps we were compelled to take do not relate in any way to Russia's foreign policy or to Poland.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] You said earlier that it is premature to bury democracy in Russia. But Poles do see, however, the development of nationalist tendencies, they see what Zhirinovskiy is doing and saying. Do you not think this is a vicious circle? On the one hand, we fear that joining NATO will strengthen Russian nationalism, and, on the other, we want to enter the treaty just because we fear your nationalists?

[Kashlev] I understand Polish fears of the possibility that nationalist forces may come to power in Russia. I also understand fears related to economic and political stability in our country. That is why we have presented Europe with the suggestion of creating a system that would guarantee each state with security. Bilateral and global. We are prepared to sign bilateral agreements guaranteeing security.

We also suggest that, jointly with the United States and Europe, we could guarantee the security of specific regions, and, in particular, Poland. I do not think it is offensive when a larger country guarantees the security of its neighbor—a smaller, worried state. All we need is time, just a couple of years to develop this project.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] But guarantees given to Poland by the United States and Russia will be viewed by us as an attempt by two superpowers to reach an agreement over our heads. One other thing. Over the years, peace in Europe was possible thanks to a division of the continent into spheres of influence. There was the Soviet zone and there was the U.S. zone, and there was a balance between the two. Can such a global policy of superpowers work in the future? It has already failed in the Balkans.

[Kashlev] As far as superpower guarantees are concerned, it is worth noticing that Ukraine has asked Russia, the United States, and Great Britain for security guarantees. This is a precedent! It is thus clear there are no reasons to fear another division of the world. Besides, we are offering not only guarantees from the United States and Russia, but also from West Europe—either directly, or within the framework of a compact security system. This cannot be done in a day, of course. As far as the global policy of superpowers is concerned, I am skeptical. The Americans claim, for instance, that they are the only superpower. Yet, in terms of economy, Japan is a giant, and the younger generation will live to see the age of China. Of course, superpowers will always play an important role in the world, but I do not think they will dominate. Yugoslavia is proof of that. Who would have imagined until recently that giants such as the United States and Russia could not reach an agreement on such an 'insignificant' state as Yugoslavia!

That situation is a result of the democratization of international relations, of the emergence of states that wish and do speak in a voice of their own. They may not be controlled any longer. Moreover, there appear not only state interests, but national and nationalist interests as well. Hence, the important role of the CSCE as an institution that has more means at its disposal than any superpower.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Poles are afraid of one other thing—namely, that Russia will have problems coordinating its foreign policy. Contradictory concepts of that policy not only are stated by the president or a relevant minister, but also the head of intelligence, a general, and others come up with altogether different ideas.

[Kashlev] That is true. There were situations when various individuals said different things on freign policy. The iron rule is that foreign policies are implemented by the president and the foreign minister. Of course, the parliament may give various advice. But the guidelines for the governments of foreign states should be what the president, the relevant minister, and the Federation's ambassadors, who represent the president, say about foreign policy. Other opinions should not be binding. [passage omitted]

Solidarity Asks Walesa To Veto 1995 Budget

LD0501200995 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1900 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidium of the Solidarity National Commission asked President Lech Walesa to veto the 1995 budget law. This was announced by trade union spokesman Piotr Zak after a meeting of the presidium in Gdansk.

Polls on Popularity of Politicians, Parties

WS0601120095 Poznan WPROST in Polish 8 Jan 95 pp 18-20

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "Pentor for WPROST: Popularity of Politicians; Below Zero"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *"And his name is Forty and Four," wrote our great poet Mickiewicz. It is doubtful, however, that the author of "Dziady" [famous Polish drama] quoted the cabalistic number with the fall of trust of Polish politicians in mind. In all, they have lost 60 points, gaining a mere 16.*

Jacek Kuron was the only one to rise above the level of "forty and four," although he also lost some supporters. The greatest loser this time was the leader of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], Aleksander Kwasniewski. The loss of so many supporters, also visible in the presidential polls in which he held a much higher position last time, is probably due to the negative impression he made at the meeting of the SLD and Polish Peasant Party [PSL] parliamentary clubs with the president and his waning activity on the political scene. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy prime minister and minister of justice, lost just as many points. Disappointment with the "clean hands campaign" may, however, soon be compensated for by his intervention in the case of the assassin of Father Popieluszko. As for Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, we are dealing with, to use the prime minister's pet phrase, "such an interesting thing" that the declining trend in social trust is now becoming steady.

The victor in this year's first popularity poll was Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski (with a score of eight points). The reason for his success might have been the hunger strike of employees of the health sector, which Solidarity supported. It is very likely, on the other hand, that the rising popularity of the trade union, coupled by a decline in support for all of the remaining politicians, could be a manifestation of social discontent with Waldemar Pawlak's inefficient rule and a result of the need to identify someone who will act as spokesman for the dissatisfied. Krzaklewski's good result may thus be one more sign of the "hot winter" to come. If Krzaklewski took the opportunity, he could become leader of the rightist groups that are so fond of him, especially because groups and politicians from the antiliberal right are concerned that support obtained in polls on the popularity of political parties and potential presidential candidates may barely suffice, considering the sampling error. President Lech Walesa has returned to the list after a short absence. The satisfaction of preceding the leader of the Confederation for an Independent Poland may be diminished by the fact that support for the president's opponents has risen to new heights.

Primate Jozef Glemp was taken into consideration for the very first time in a poll conducted by Pentor for WPROST. It was no longer possible to neglect him, considering the efficient way in which he has been becoming involved in politics. The primate made it to 10th place out of 20, which one may say is an average result. His policies raise strong reactions. Asked whether the church should be subsidized by the state budget, only five out of the 1,004 persons polled replied, "I do not know." Such a strong polarization of opinions, accompanied by widespread reluctance to fund the church with taxpayers' money, is one of the effects of the primate's policy. One has to notice the success he achieved: The primate was ranked two points ahead of Barbara Labuda, the Freedom Union deputy known for her antagonistic attitude toward the church.

In the popularity polls that Pentor has been conducting for four years now, one may observe recurring changes of opinion in politicians. Once in a while a sharp decline in popularity occurs, which is usually visible already in the headlines: "Slump," "Everybody Down," "Pendulum." The naturally wavering public moods are particularly typical of countries undergoing a revolution, an economic crisis, or rapid transformations. Lack of stability and security causes both voters and, what is worse, politicians to give way to emotions under which a radicalization of opinions becomes stronger.

At the same time, the peaceful character of transformations allows for a gradual evolution of political culture. It is becoming increasingly difficult for demagogues and modern-day Jacobins to gain wide public support. Contrary to universal belief, the Poles are more reluctant to judge parties by their leaders only. Despite the relatively low support for Ryszard Bugaj, his Union of Labor [UP] ranks fourth. Aleksander Kwasniewski lost a large number of supporters, but not the SLD.

Voters are much better at differentiating between the roles politicians may play. Jacek Kuron, widely acclaimed as a "social politician," has taken a definite lead on the list of presidential candidates only recently. Jozef Oleksy, widely esteemed as speaker of the Sejm, stands the same chance of moving into Namiestnikowski Palace [presidential residence] as its current inhabitant has of staying there.

It sometimes happens that society learns much faster than politicians. It has become common practice for rightist parties to argue which of them is to produce a candidate for president. This time the opinion poll undermines the right's nurtured self-image of being keen politicians, capable of supplying a long list of outstanding candidates.

The intensity of system reforms, on the other hand, causes a search for radical methods of curing the state. Although the number of people who support the concept of dissolving parliament before its term is over is less than half the number of its opponents, nearly half of those polled were unable to adopt a clear attitude. Indecision may be due either to mixed feelings about the results of the current parliament or to democracy itself. Disapproval of top state authorities is quite frequent in countries where democracy is deeply rooted, but it rarely causes such a sharp and widespread decline of the popularity of politicians—from full support to complete rejection.

Politicians themselves are to blame to a huge extent. Many of them seem completely devoid of the self-preservation instinct, secluding themselves in a world of

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their own problems and demonstrating a backfiring tendency to brutalize competition. Fortunately, politicians do not literally lose their heads in difficult situations, as was the case in revolutions of the past.

Should parliament be dissolved before its term is over?

	Percent
Yes	19
No	37
Do not know	44

Support for Particular Politicians (in percent)

	Yes	No	Do Not Know Him/ Her	Percent Change
Jacek Kuron	57	38	5	Down 6
Andrzej Olechowski	45	43	2	Down 6
Jozef Oleksy	41	49	10	Down 4
Aleksander Kwasniewski	40	51	9	Down 11
Waldemar Pawlak	37	59	4	Down 9
Zbigniew Religa	37	49	14	Down 4
Marian Krzaklewski	33	53	14	Up 8
Leszek Balcerowicz	32	59	9	Up 1
Hanna Suchocka	31	62	7	
Jozef Glemp	30	66	4	
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	30	65	5	Down 2
Barbara Labuda	28	51	21	Up 1
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz	26	62	12	Down 11
Grzegorz Kolodko	26	53	21	Up 4
Bronislaw Geremek	25	66	9	Down 4
Ryszard Bugaj	23	52	25	
Ewa Spychalska	23	51	26	Up 2
Leszek Miller	21	64	15	Down 1
Lech Walesa	21	76	3	
Leszek Moczulski	19	72	9	Down 2

Popularity of Presidential Candidates

	Percent
Aleksander Kwasniewski	17
Andrzej Olechowski	14
Jacek Kuron	13
Lech Walesa	9
Jozef Oleksy	8
Hanna Suchocka	5
Marian Krzaklewski	3
Adam Strzembosz	2
Alicja Grzeskowiak	1
Other	28

Popularity of Parties

	Percent	Percent Change
Democratic Left Alliance	25	
Polish Peasant Party	19	Down 1
Freedom Union	16	Up 1
Union of Labor	11	
Solidarity	9	Up 4
Confederation for an Independent Poland	7	Up 1
Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms	6	Up 1
Center Accord	2	Down 2
Christian National Union	2	
Union for Real Politics	1	Down 2
Other	2	

Note: The minimum percentage of votes required for parties to enter parliament is 5.

Should the Catholic Church be subsidized from the state budget?

	Percent
Yes	19
No	81

GS Reviews Army's Achievements Over Past Year

WS0501145495 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 5 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by "Z.L.": "General Staff on Changes in Army; Revolution Without a Gunshot"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Military "revival" of the eastern border and the establishedment of an entirely new "aeromobile" division, which can be defined as a rapid deployment force, in the center of the country—these are the most spectacular achievements of the Army during the past year, the General Staff [GS] believes.

The armored brigades in Przemysl, Zurawica, and Jaroslaw, the mountain infantry in Rzeszow, the artillery in Suwalki, and mechanized troops in Siedlce, Bialystok, and Hrubieszow—these are all the defensive pillars along the militarily weak eastern borders, which the Army has been diligently putting back into place. After it is fully formed, the entirely new 25th Airborne Cavalry Division, stationed in the area of Lodz and equipped

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with Huzar combat helicopters made in Swidnik, is to be an elite formation capable of rapid air maneuvers, which should make it possible to use this unit anywhere in the country. These are the optimistic announcements of the GS. However, how soon they will be put into effect depends on the condition of the military coffers.

For the time being, a new mobilization system has been worked out, which envisions, among other things, that, in the advent a war, part of the economy will be subordinated to defense tasks, and production will be adjusted to meet the needs of the Army not only in state-owned companies. The principles of the new system are, of course, top secret. It is known, however, that the introduction of the new order in areas where various interests clashed before called for changes comparable to the political and economic transformations in the country. Military officials also say that, during last year's exercises of officers and staff, the Army managed to verify, with positive results, the entirely new rules of achieving increased combat alerts. The term itself may sound formidable, but the essence of modernizing boils down to loosening the ties of strict rigor that have guided commanders for decades. The commanders saw to it, for instance, that no more than 30 percent of soldiers had the right to leave the barracks on leave or...on sick leave. Now, far more flexible rules have been adopted. In short, the rules have been adjusted to real life.

Preparations are under way throughout the Army to pass from the ponderous regiment structures, which have retained the spirit of the previous system, to brigade-based structures. These are more universal and more comparable to the structures adopted in NATO. This new order has already been introduced in the newly established Krakow Military District. In addition, some divisions have been reorganized in the Silesian and Warsaw Military Districts as well.

Last year saw substantial changes in the military education sector. The number of higher officers schools was reduced by half—to four—and the number of main training centers was cut from more than a dozen to just a few. In all, the number of workplaces in the ministry's schools at various levels decreased by at least half.

The GS says that more steps were taken that drew us closer to the military structures of NATO: visits paid by NATO commanders, and exercises held—more for the sake of propaganda—as part of the Partnership for Peace program, such as the first maneuvers in East Europe, with the participation of 13 states, in Biedrusko. We hosted the French, Germans, Danish, British, and Dutch, and even soldiers from Luxembourg, who came to Poland mostly in small groups. Our soldiers had some training in the mountains of France, as well as on the plains of the Netherlands and England. We have conducted sea rescue maneuvers with our Western friends. For the time being, we have not had any training in Germany. However, contact between specific units and soldiers is very easy. Even a special patronage agreement was signed at the highest level.

Cadres received a special order to learn English. It is difficult to imagine that a platoon commander has to be assisted by a translator in combat, staff strategists say.

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Serb Tank Attacks Cause Casualties Around Bihac

AU0501160095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 95

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no peace in the Bihac region today either. Karadzic's and Martic's chetniks have continued to attack the Bosanska Krupa front, and the entire territory of the Velika Kladusa commune. Over the last 24 hours they have intensified the artillery and tank attacks from the so-called Serb autonomous province of Krajina, particularly on Johovica, where Martic's and Karadzic's chetniks keep trying to break through with infantry. They have also been attacking in the region of Trnava, where they are constantly trying to infiltrate sabotage groups. Huge material damage has been inflicted in the attacks, and—according to incomplete information—a dozen people have suffered major or minor injuries, and three people have been killed.

The intensity of the attacks on Bosanska Krupa has not waned, and the chetniks are firing from tanks at the residential areas on the left bank of the Una River, demolishing them mercilessly. The information from that part of the front speaks of many casualties among both the fighters and the civilians.

On the Bihac part of the front, as well as Grabez and the Grmusa-Srbljani plateau, they fired for provocation for most of the day.

The meeting of the regional commission for monitoring the cease-fire scheduled for today has not been held since the aggressor's representatives did not appear, which is further evidence of their disrespect for agreements in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Enemy Provocations; Vehicle Column in Zavidovici

AU0601094695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 6 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the past 24 hours, enemy provocations on our defense lines have been registered on the Zavidovici front, in the theater of operations of the Bosna Operations Group. Here is a report by the Bosna Operations Group Press Center:

[Begin unidentified correspondent recording] Occasional provocations with infantry weapons by Karadzic's Serbs along all (?Serbian) defense lines were registered yesterday in the Bosna Operations Group theater of operations. A larger column of vehicles from Ozren heading for Vozuca shows the real (?picture) of the truce [words indistinct] the aggressor. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H, Serb, UN Officers To Verify Withdrawal

AU0601095595 Paris AFP in English 0925 GMT 6 Jan 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Jan 6 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb, government and UN officers aboard the same helicopter were Friday to survey a disputed sector of a demilitarized zone [DMZ] near here to verify the withdrawal of Bosnian Army troops, a UN spokesman announced.

Bosnian forces, having failed to respect a Wednesday deadline to leave the area, were still occupying parts of the zone early Friday, spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon said. But the government has pledged to quit the zone, located on Mt. Igman south of here, in accordance with an agreement it made on Monday with the United Nations and rebel Serb military authorities.

The troops evacuated the 100-square-kilometer (40 square-mile) DMZ during the day Wednesday but several units later returned to re-occupy about seven square kilometers.

By late Thursday, according to UN military sources, they were still holding three positions. Serb officers, protesting the continued presence of troops in the DMZ, earlier in the day boycotted a regional commission meeting of government and UN officials to discuss the application of a four-month ceasefire around Sarajevo. "The area has not been completely evacuated," Major Gourmelon said Friday.

But the UN commander for Bosnia, General Michael Rose, was nonetheless planning to meet with officers from the mainly-Moslem army and Serb forces at Sarajevo airport at noon to discuss overall ceasefire verification procedures for the entire country. [passage omitted]

Gourmelon said that in clashes overnight around Velika Kladusa in the north of the pocket, held by rebel Moslem leader Fikret Abdic, UN officials had recorded 68 incidents of heavy weapons fire, including four to eight mortars. Further south in the pocket, around Bihac town, there were 10 small arms bursts, he said.

But he added that a UN convoy carrying fuel and food to around 1,100 Bangladeshi United Nations troops in the pocket managed to arrive at its destination late Thursday.

Army: 'Absurd' Serb Demands Endangering Agreement

AU0501173495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] (?The implementation) of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, that is, the four-month cease-fire, signed on 31 December last year with the aggressor's side is facing considerable problems. It became particularly evident in the talks held on 4 January of this year that the aggressor is completely ignoring the demands set by the Bosnia-Herzegovina representatives for a thorough implementation of the signed agreement, primarily in connection with the opening of the blue routes, and the cease-fire in the Bihac region. This is said in the statement by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center.

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The aggressor's representatives do not even wish to discuss a cease-fire in the Bihac region, where the aggressor's units are even intensifying attacks on residential areas. Yesterday three people were killed, and 26 people were wounded in enemy artillery attacks on the Bihac region.

Today four enemy [word indistinct] attacks on the Bosanska Krupa and Velika Kladusa parts of the front were repulsed and [words indistinct]. And while the aggressor's representatives do not even wish to talk about a cease-fire in the Bihac region, they are trying to divert the focus of the talks to areas where there is no fighting at all. They are also setting absurd demands, so, for example for the Mt. Igman region they are demanding the demarcation lines to be based on the situation from 9 February 1994, and that the lines so established should be controlled by the aggressor's (officers), and not the observers of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. The hitherto activities on the implementation of the cease-fire agreement also reveal that UNPROFOR has a detailed plan upon which it acts, even though that plan has not been coordinated with the Bosnia-Herzegovina representatives, (without) whose knowledge aggressor's liaison officers have been deployed in the regional commissions for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

Noticing the deficiency [word indistinct] the cease-fire agreement, the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have proposed to the UNPROFOR representatives to present these plans clearly to both the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the aggressor's side, [word indistinct] for the implementation of the agreement, and that these plans should be used as a basis for a general [word indistinct] acceptance of the plan. The plan would contain concrete instructions and rules for the realization of all the points in the cease-fire agreement. This is all the more necessary if one keeps in mind that Point 6 of the cease-fire agreement says that the signatories to the agreement will observe immediately and to the letter all the previously signed agreements.

However, the behavior and the attitude of the aggressor and his representatives shows that their basic goal is to freeze the current situation at any cost, and that the cease-fire is nothing but a new frame that will enable the continuation of the aggression. It is obvious that the aggressor has again failed the readiness-for-peace test and is not prepared for a reasonable compromise, by willfully deciding which points of the signed agreement he will implement and which points he will not. However, only the full implementation of all the provisions of the agreement, including all the previously signed agreements and arrangements, can mean a cease-fire. Everything else is just the continuation of the aggression and another setback from real peace, reports the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center.

Serb General Blames Muslims for Meeting Failure

LD0501230095 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2208 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—The Muslims bear sole responsibility for the failure of today's meeting of the regional commission for Sarajevo, as they failed to implement what had been agreed, Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Gvero, the deputy chief of the general staff of the Srpska republic army, told SRNA this evening.

In his words, the Serb commission—according to the plan—went for talks with the Muslim commission and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], but the Muslim side failed to keep its promise. It did not withdraw its soldiers from the demilitarized areas on Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica. Gen. Gvero said that "there were no grounds for further talks under such circumstances."

On Monday, during the tripartite meeting at Sarajevo airport, the Muslims had accepted withdrawing their soldiers from the demilitarized areas on Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica. The withdrawal of the Muslim units, which had taken control of this area last autumn, was supposed to have been completed by midday yesterday.

Karadzic Suspends 'State of War' in Corps Zone

LD0601124795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1205 GMT 6 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 6 Jan (SRNA)—On the basis of his constitutional competences and the people's assembly decisions and with a view to implementing the agreed peace plan, Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic today decided to suspend the state of war in the operational zone of the 2d Krajina Corps of the Srpska republic army and reverse it to a state of immediate danger of war [stanje neposredne ratne opasnosti].

According to a statement dispatched to SRNA from the president's office, this decision will come into effect on 7 January 1995.

"The organization, composition, competences, and functioning of state bodies in various spheres, as well as the legislature, will be carried out in line with regulations applicable during a state of immediate danger of war," the statement says.

President Karadzic, who is supreme commander of the Srpska republic armed forces, also announced that the earlier decision on the highest level of combat readiness throughout the Srpska republic, on a general mobilization, and on the ban on leaving the state territory without special permission from the defense minister remains in effect.

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UN Demands Krajina Serbs Withdraw From Bihac

AU0501172995 Paris AFP in English 1647 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 5 (AFP)—The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) demanded Thursday [5 January] the withdrawal from Bosnia of Croatian Serb secessionists, adding it was concerned over fighting in the northwestern enclave of Bihac.

UN spokesman Paul Risley said in Zagreb that UNPROFOR remained concerned over "fighting involving RSK (troops of the self-declared Serb republic of Krajina) within Bosnia." But he noted a recent "reduction in the level of fighting and firing directly coming from RSK positions within Bosnia. "We also received some assurances and indications that they are withdrawing from those positions within Bosnia," Risley said, but he stressed "we would like to see them withdraw from Bosnia."

UNPROFOR wants foreign troops in Bosnia to withdraw from the republic following a cessation of hostilities signed by the warring factions late last month, but is making an exception for the Bosnian Serbs. Risley said UNPROFOR was also concerned by the ongoing fighting around Bihac, with UN observers having noted 116 explosions Wednesday to the east and south of Velika Kladusa, at the northwestern tip of the enclave.

Meanwhile the blockading inside Velika Kladusa of a 16-lorry UN aid convoy bearing food and fuel supplies for Bangladeshi UN troops in the Bihac pocket went into a second day Thursday. Risley said the convoy was being prevented from leaving Velika Kladusa by forces of dissident Moslem leader Fikret Abdic, who regained control of Velika Kladusa with Croatian Serb help last month after he was ejected by Bosnian Army troops in August.

Risley said Abdic's troops had tried to loot the convoy, calling the blockade a "very ugly situation." Risley said UN personnel were "continuing to press Abdic forces to allow this convoy to go through" towards Coralici, the Bangladeshi troops' base to the south." "We are no longer able to patrol with armoured vehicles at the hospital (in Bihac) because of the lack of fuel," he added.

UN spokesman Edward Joseph earlier told AFP that Krajina Serbs were blockading the convoy, which left Zagreb early Wednesday with authorisation from Krajina Serbs to pass through the region. Serb forces control all access points into Bihac pocket from Croatia. Joseph said the Krajina Serbs, allies of Abdic, had insisted on the convoy travelling via the town and had forced it to spend the night there. The UN spokesman said the convoy was subject to an "unacceptable" detailed search, with its cargo unceremoniously unloaded in the snow. Those on board were forced to wait in the cold during the inspection, he said. Velika Kladusa has been surrounded for 32 months by Bosnian Serbs to the east and Croatian Serbs to the south, west and north.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said meanwhile in Geneva that some 20,000 people had returned to the town in recent days, despite inter-Moslem fighting there on Wednesday. The ICRC also asked for official clearance to replenish stocks of material in Bihac town where it said "the situation continued to deteriorate."

Krajina Serbs Hold Up UN Convoy Near Bihac

AU0501141395 Paris AFP in English 1341 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan 5 (AFP)—Secessionist Croatian Serbs are blockading a UN aid convoy in Velika Kladusa, in the northwest of the Moslem enclave of Bihac in western Bosnia, UN spokesman Edward Joseph told AFP Thursday.

The convoy, bearing food and fuel supplies for Bangladeshi UN troops in the Bihac pocket area, left Zagreb early Wednesday after obtaining authorisation to pass through the region from Serbs based in Krajina, Croatia. The Serbs control all access points into the Bihac pocket from Croatia.

Joseph said the Krajina Serbs had insisted on the convoy travelling via Velika Kladusa, where they had forced it to spend the night. The UN spokesman said the convoy was subject to an "unacceptable" detailed search, adding all the vehicles had been unceremoniously unloaded in the snow. Those on board were forced to wait in the cold during the inspection. Joseph added that a senior UN negotiator had arrived in Velika Kladusa from Zagreb to negotiate the convoy's passage.

Velika Kladusa is a small town which sits at the northwestern edge of the Bihac pocket. It has been surrounded for 32 months by Bosnian Serbs to the east and Croatian Serbs to the south, west and north. Since mid-December the town has been under the control of forces loyal to dissident Moslem commander Fikret Abdic, who has allied himself with the Serbs. The Krajina Serbs and their heavy artillery helped Abdic to retake his stronghold after Bosnian Government forces drove him out in August.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said meanwhile in Geneva that some 20,000 people had returned in recent days to their homes in Velika Kladusa, despite inter-Moslem fighting there on Wednesday. "The inhabitants, up to now refugees in two camps in the zone under UN protection, have been returning to the region over the past few days with their children and their possessions in lorries, coaches or in horse-drawn carts," according to a Red Cross statement released late Wednesday. The statement said moves had been made to provide urgent water supplies as well as furnaces and medical supplies for the returning people.

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In its statement, the ICRC asked for official clearance to replenish stocks of material in Bihac town where it said "the situation continued to deteriorate." A convoy is due to set off for the town in the coming days to bring in medical supplies and chlorine to purify the water there.

UN Recalls Aid Convoy

AU0501213695 Paris AFP in English 2117 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Jan 5 (AFP)—The UN refugee agency Thursday [5 January] ordered an aid convoy to leave the northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac after secessionist Croatian Serbs in the town of Velika Kladusa denied passage to a separate convoy.

"We are calling the convoy back to avoid our staff suffering the humiliations forced on a UN convoy at Velika Kladusa," said Peter Kessler, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, adding that the UNHCR was now considering parachuting food into the enclave. "We will do everything we can to see that humanitarian aid gets into the region, including parachute drops," Kessler said.

A convoy sent by the UN Protection Force and bearing food and fuel supplies for Bangladeshi UN troops in the Bihac pocket area, was forced to stop overnight Wednesday in Velika Kladusa by separatist Croatian Serbs. UN spokesman Edward Joseph told AFP by telephone that the convoy was subject to an "unacceptable" detailed search by supporters of maverick Moslem warlord Fikret Abdic. The convoy was unceremoniously unloaded in the snow while those on board were forced to wait in the cold during the inspection, Joseph said.

Abdic's forces are fighting the Bosnian Government Army in the enclave, backed by Croatian Serb forces.

Early Thursday, an anti-tank missile landed closed to the place where the convoy was stopped, UNPROFOR spokesman Thant Myint-U said in Zagreb.

Joseph added that a senior UN negotiator had arrived in Velika Kladusa from Zagreb to negotiate the convoy's passage. [passage omitted]

Observers Intercept Convoy Meant for Serbs

AU0501215795 Paris AFP in English 2145 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nudo, Yugoslavia, Jan 5 (AFP)—A failed attempt to smuggle petrol, oil and cigarettes to Bosnian Serbs across the border between Montenegro and Bosnia has left 23 trucks stranded on a narrow mountain road here for the last six days.

The bid to get 16 fuel tankers and seven heavy goods vehicles into Bosnia began on December 30 at the border post at Nudo, one of 32 crossing points under special watch by international observers charged with ensuring that the frontier between rump-Yugoslavia, made up of Serbia and Montenegro, and that part of Bosnia under Serb control is sealed.

There were no observers present on December 30 and the sanctions-busters had laid their plans carefully. They gambled that on the Yugoslav side staffing would be reduced because of the New Year celebrations. On the Bosnian side a bulldozer had been brought up to clear the road, blocked by a 1.5 metre (five foot) barrier of stones built by Yugoslav police. Unfortunately for the smugglers they had miscalculated the readiness of the Montenegrin authorities to turn a blind eye, international observers told reporters.

One by one the trucks moved along the track until it narrowed to an impassible 2.5 metres (eight feet) wide, the length of the convoy making it impossible to reverse out. And on Thursday they were still there, the drivers trying unsuccessfully, among clouds of exhaust fumes, to extricate themselves.

The licence plates of the tankers give some indication of what the scale of petrol-smuggling between Montenegro and Bosnia must be. Most carried Montenegrin plates but others had come from Sarajevo, Modrica and Bijeljina in northeast Bosnia, Trebinje in the south and even from Knin, "capital" of the breakaway Croatian Serbs of Krajina.

The chief international observer, retired Swedish General Bo Pellnas, visited the scene Thursday and said he was "rather convinced" of the efficacity of the blockade imposed on the Bosnian Serbs by the Yugoslav authorities. He said he would submit a new "positive report" to the international conference on former Yugoslavia which supervises the mission. Like his three previous reports, it will be sent to the United Nations Security Council which is due soon to reexamine the international embargo being operated against Yugoslavia.

The sanctions were eased at the end of September for a period of 100 days, due to end on January 13.

Minister: Cease-Fire Not To Be 'Overestimated'

AU0501200795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The signed agreement on the cessation of hostilities is a significant document, but—as Prime Minister Silajdzic said yesterday—it should not be overestimated, as our initial experience with its implementation shows. This was said at a Party of Democratic Action of Bosnia-Herzegovina news conference today by Hasan Muratovic, minister of the state committee for relations with the United Nations and minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government.

He stressed that journalists, too, had great responsibility in this in the sense of writing about this agreement, about facts, and through commenting on it and sometimes using scant information. Based on what I know, we must

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not deceive people into relaxing too much over this agreement, he said. The agreement is good but the results in its implementation so far are very modest, Dr. Muratovic stressed. Minister Muratovic said that meetings were being held but they were not producing any concrete results. His impression is that the civilian structures of authority in Pale want to implement this agreement, but that the military structures are still not ready for a cessation of hostilities. They reveal this fact both on the ground and at negotiations. Yesterday one Serb officer alone spoke for six and a half hours out of the seven hours of talks.

My impression is that the Serb civilian structures in Pale want a cease-fire and the resumption of negotiations. The military structures in Pale have signed this agreement, but they are not observing it. We always first bring up the question of the Bihac region as the condition for any serious approach to the implementation of the agreement, but not even the first cease-fire agreement has been implemented there. The UN Protection Force should do more on informing the journalists better about the situation if the Bihac region.

I believe that most of the people on the Serb side have had enough of this war, and that they would support those who finally want to talk about peace, Minister Muratovic said.

Presidency Member Calls Clinton 'Dumb Blond'

BR0601112795 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 6 Jan 95 p 10

[Interview with Stjepan Kljujic, member of the Bosnian Presidency, by Renata Pisu in Sarajevo; date not given: "It Will Be World War III"

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo—*We met with Stjepan Kljujic in the government palace. He is a Croatian, and therefore a Catholic, but above all he considers himself a Bosnian. He is a member of the Izetbegovic government and chairman of the Republican Party, the only opposition party in Bosnia-Herzegovina.*

[LA REPUBBLICA] You are a member of the government and at the same time the leader of an opposition party. What does it mean today to be in the opposition in Bosnia?

[Kljujic] It means that you want democracy, dialogue, and free access to the media for all. At the moment it is hard for us to put our message across on TV and radio. We are about to publish our own newspaper called THE REPUBLIC, like yours, but we have few resources, we do not have enough paper, we do not have enough of anything. Now Izetbegovic is openly speaking and acting too openly in the Muslims' name and that is not right. Bosnia is a multiracial country and the government must represent everybody or the tragedy will only get worse. Two wars are being fought here in parallel, one for peace in Bosnia and another for democracy. There is no democratic tradition here and to build one above all we need peace, and then time.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Do you think there is a real danger of a surge of fundamentalism in Bosnia?

[Kljujic] No, that danger does not exist and must not exist. However, our country has been betrayed by the West with the result that it has been driven, against its will, into the arms of the Muslim countries which said they were prepared to help. Iran, for example, is helping us, and you can be sure it is doing so for its own advantage. However, the Bosnian Muslims are Sunnites, not fundamentalist Shiites. The fact is, we are in a such a situation that if the Devil himself came to give us a helping hand we would accept it. However, Europe must not dream up an Islamist Bosnia just ot make it easier for it to turn its back on us.

[LA REPUBBLICA] What do you think of the problem of the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia?

[Kljujic] We are in favor of the demilitarization of the Balkans but if the Contact Group plan fails, the war will continue regardless, and it would matter little whether or not there were an embargo because there are always people prepared to supply arms and more than happy to do so... not out of friendship or goodwill. They do so for the money. Are they expensive? The fact is that our country has been punished excessively, beyond all reasonable limits. It is not protected by international law and is up against the strongest and best-armed army in European, the Serb army. It has the Russians behind it. They have imposed an embargo on us not because they want to bring the war to an end but because they want us to surrender.

[LA REPUBBLICA] What, in your opinion, does the near future hold?

[Kljujic] Either the war is halted by international law or the war goes on for another 15 or 20 years. Then it will no longer just be confined to the former Yugoslavia, but there will be a chain reaction throughout Europe.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Do you mean you can glimpse the start of World War III?

[Kljujic] Absolutely. I am amazed that nobody in the West can understand that. There is your [Italian Prime Minister] Berlusconi, whoever he is, there is [French President] Mitterrand who is more dead than alive, and there is Clinton who is just a dumb blond... As for Russia, we have seen Yeltsin's arrogance in Chechnya. The Westerners are blind and are all responsible for the catastrophe they are now preparing with their own hands. [Kljujic ends]

Stjepan Kljuic began to get hot under the collar. He described the catastrophe of the near future. "More of your people will die than ours, because our survival, here in Sarajevo, after 2,000 days of war, is something of a

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miracle. However, miracles do not repeat themselves. You have too high a standard of living to be able to survive. The better off you are, the less you can bear privations." His secretary whispered to me: "Could you, in Milan or Rome, survive on just two liters of water a day?"

Karadzic Issues Christmas, New Year Message

LD0501205795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1727 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 Jan (SRNA)—SRNA is carrying Christmas and New Year greetings by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic and the supreme commander of the Srpska republic armed forces, courtesy of the bureau for press contacts of the Srpska republic.

"To his holiness the Serbian patriarch, the archpriests, priests, and monks of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and to all citizens of the Srpska republic, Serbs in all Serb states and in the diaspora throughout the world, I convey Christmas and New Year greetings and I say to them with joy—Christ is born.

"Hoping that we are getting closer to a lasting peace, I wish the soldiers and officers of the Srpska republic army to celebrate this Christmas and all the future ones in the belief that the glowing results of our struggle and victory will be recognized as a just outcome by the entire world, and that when peace is reached in the near future they could devote themselves to the construction of their country and to their personal and family happiness and prosperity.

"I extend the same wishes to the soldiers and officers of the army of the republic of Serb Krajina. To all people, farmers, workers, pensioners, students, children, and all other citizens—thanking them for all their sacrifices and for bearing all their pain stoically—I wish this to be the last year of self-denial, and hope this Christmas and New Year will fill their hearts with joy and their homes with happiness.

"With deeply felt love and loyalty we remember the blessed victims who contributed to our freedom, and we remember them in our prayers. By the will of God, may Christmas and the New Year bring new happiness, fill their hearts with joy, and bring goodwill to all Serbs everywhere, to the entire Orthodox world, and to all the people."

Croat Police Refuse To Cooperate With EU

LD0501202895 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Attempts to set up a joint police force under the auspices of the EU administration in Mostar have come up against objective difficulties. Milan Vego has the report.

[Vego] The agreement on the setting up of a joint police force under EU supervision in Mostar envisages the creation of a joint headquarters consisting of police representatives from western and eastern parts of Mostar and of EU policemen. [passage omitted]

There are certain difficulties in the implementation of this agreement. Mile Puljic, the vice president of the Mostar municipal council, had the following to say about it:

[Begin Puljic recording] Today we had a meeting with the European police. They requested that they be allowed to supervise the work of our police officers, in other words, to deploy people who would completely supervise the work of the police station. However, I must say that the police are the basis of any state. Seeing that I fought, am still fighting, and will continue to fight for Herceg-Bosna, I believe that this constitutes meddling in the very foundations of Herceg-Bosna, and I believe that neither I nor anyone else have the mandate to sign the agreement. Therefore, I must say once again today that we cannot accept it and that perhaps higher institutions should deal with this issue. [end recording]

[Vego] Of course, all this shows that Mostar cannot be viewed as isolated from the process of setting up the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, primarily because of its specific characteristics. The laws of the Federation are still not in force in Mostar, so the talks will probably progress much more slowly than in the beginning until an overall political solution is found.

Croats: Muslims Have Not Released All POW's

LD0501215795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In August last year, the Croat Defense Council [HVO] and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army signed an agreement on the exchange of prisoners according to the all-for-all principle. The Bosniak side has not yet complied with the agreement, Berislav Pusic, the head of Herceg-Bosna's office for the exchange, said. The Bosniaks still hold two HVO members at the military prison in Zenica. At the same time, Herceg-Bosna's office for exchange has carried out all its obligations stemming from the agreement.

We have also learned that three Islamic warriors were captured recently in HVO-controlled area. They came to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units from Morocco, Palestine, and Kuwait.

Official Invites Croats To Build Own State

LD0501213695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2010 GMT 5 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 5 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croat parliament official Ivan Bender on Thursday exhorted the Bosnian Croats to direct their state-building efforts only to their state of Herceg-Bosna.

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Speaking in a Radio Herzeg-Bosna broadcast, lower house speaker Bender said, "this is the time when each and every Croat must make his full contribution to the creation of the Croat state as the only guarantee of the Croats' survival in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

On the other hand, Bosnian Muslim leaders have been insisting on Muslim-controlled Radio Sarajevo that the Muslim-Croat federation will remain a dead letter for as long as the "phantom state of Herceg-Bosna continues to haunt" Bosnia-Herzegovina. They said that Herceg-Bosna was "a millstone around the neck" of the federation, created under strong pressure from Washington in March 1994.

The Washington Agreement has failed to relax tensions between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, who have revived their latent war in the Neretva River valley in the new year. The federation agreement came after nearly a year of fierce Muslim-Croat fighting for control of territories with mixed populations, accompanied with "ethnic cleansing," which exacted a heavy price in casualties and material devastation.

Both Radio Herzeg-Bosna and Radio Sarajevo on Wednesday reported on the other side's violations of the Washington Agreement, trading accusations of first strikes.

Muslim radio stations said Bosnian Croats had on Wednesday shelled the Muslim-held eastern part of the southern city of Mostar.

Muslim-Croat fighting was reported to have escalated also in central Bosnia.

Croats Said Not To Attend Federation Government

LD0501182595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1704 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—Muslim reporters from Sarajevo today reported that no member of the Croat nationality had attended a session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Government, held in this town yesterday.

The same source said that all Bosnian Croat ministers and deputies had left Sarajevo as long ago as 12 December and that there were no official reports on their return.

According to the Muslim newspaper OSLOBODJENJE, they [Bosnian Croats] held a session in Neum at the end of December without even informing Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic about it. [passage omitted]

Ganic Views Federation, Bosniak Positions

AU0401124195 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Dec 94 p 6

[Interview with Ejup Ganic, deputy president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, by Mia Jeric, in Sarajevo; date not given: "Croats and Bosniaks—a Marriage of Convenience, Not a Love- Match"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *With the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic, was appointed deputy president of the Federation. Considering his position, deputy president Ganic was the right person to discuss the present situation in the Federation and the relations between the Croats and Bosniaks. We talked to him in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency building in Sarajevo.*

[Jeric] At the time, you stated for the media that you would set the whole of Herceg-Bosna on fire, and now, despite this statement, you are working on the establishment of the constitution—anticipated relations between the Croats and Bosniaks within the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. [sentence as published] Does that mean that your opinion has changed?

[Ganic] I never stated that we—the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army—would set the whole of Herceg-Bosna on fire; it was a mistaken interpretation on the part of reporters. I said then that unless the war stopped everything would be in flames. Naturally, someone manipulated that statement, so it turned out this way. This is an opportunity for me to state that I support the Federation between the Croats and Bosniaks.

Pushing Slowly

[Jeric] Considering the present conditions following the somewhat unsuccessful Federation Assembly session in Zenica, how do you see the relations between the Croats and Bosniaks?

[Ganic] You see, the Federation is a one-way street. I think that we both have to push slowly, not fast, so as not to destroy everything. We must be careful, because the Federation is a project offering a way out to both peoples, that is, to the entire Bosniak corps, including the Croats. We in Bosnia-Herzegovina see the Federation as a defense system from the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor and the way to preserve our country.

[Jeric] Your visit to Vitez, during which you talked to a Croat whose sons had both died fighting with the Bosniaks, was met with the great approval of the Croats. Was this event an exception or an expression of your general position?

[Ganic] I think that all of us who head the organization of the Federation should make contact with the so-called common people, although that is often very risky. As far as Vitez is concerned, and I do not know how you found that out, this event will certainly be remembered by all. Namely, I entered a cafe in Vitez where no one was expecting me, and started to talk to people. Everyone was surprised, but also encouraged. You know, it is very difficult to go out among the people, especially Croats, since there is always someone making remarks, often unpleasant, which can be very bad, especially if I have reporters with me who immediately make use of the situation. Still, I believe that such instances are a sign of courage. I also visited Gornji Vakuf, where I met Croats

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among whom my arrival first produced a silence, but soon a loud, very successful discussion developed.

[Jeric] While we are on the subject of your visit, you had an unpleasant experience in Stolac. Who would you say was responsible for this?

[Ganic] You see, the local authorities there are not organized. They were supposed to ensure my passage, as well as visits and talks. I always say that you can only ever profit from me if we talk. This may seem like a very daring statement, but it is true nevertheless. I assure you that these Croats in Stolac would have been much better off if they had talked to me then, since I had some specific proposals that the Croats there would surely have liked. Moreover, the fact is often ignored that I am the first politician to have visited the Croat village of Ravno, which no Croat politician has done because the village was under Serb siege. I was the first to inform the world of what was going on there. When I came to Ravno and saw what was going on there, I asked the Serb general Jeremija why there were no trenches or signs of fighting, why his soldiers were unshaven and looked untidy. I asked him whether they were soldiers or Chetniks. This visit disclosed the entire structure of the former JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army], especially when this commander told me that I should judge for myself what kind of soldiers they were—and, in short, they were not soldiers.

Local Authorities

[Jeric] How do you, as deputy president of the Federation, see the way out of the conflicts that still occur between the Croats and Bosniaks?

[Ganic] The problem is that first local authorities should be formed in all the cantons, in accordance with the Constitution. Once we have done that, there will be both Croats and Bosniaks in these bodies, after which the local police could be given instructions as to how they should operate. For instance, there are only Croats in Kiseljak now, and there were some 7,000 Bosniaks, who left. In the parts of the country controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the elections have been more or less completed, although we are having great problems with the refugees who cannot vote in an adequate manner. We admit that this is also a great failure on our part, that we are really late with these local elections.

[Jeric] In your opinion, who is it that obstructs the local elections?

[Ganic] If we had implemented the Federation Constitution on all the Bosnia-Herzegovina territories, it would have been much easier. This way, 75 percent of the job has been done on the territories controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, while only 20 percent has been done on the territories controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. It becomes immediately clear who is obstructing the elections.

[Jeric] An increasing number of Croats see you as the new Bosniak leader. Is this a temporary impression or is it reality?

[Ganic] I have always said that I was not born to be a leader, and I am not preparing a new party, as rumors say. My world is in fact the study of engineering, so I have always been organized and direct, which is what one should be with Croats—direct. They should be told what will happen if such and such a thing happens, what we plan to do if they do a certain thing. When there were these conflicts with the Croats, I was very direct, both in the positive and the negative sense. However, as far as my political career is concerned, I think that I am turned toward the West, and I am not burdened by the speculations about what will happen between the Croats and Bosniaks, since I know that we will have these confederate relations, even if everyone else is against it.

[Jeric] Who does the alliance suit more, the Bosniaks or the Croats?

[Ganic] This is difficult to calculate. It suits the Bosniaks, and we are not doing it for our great love toward the Croats. We do not wake up thinking "We are lucky to have the Croats". The concept suits us, and it is a strategic orientation. The Croats are the people who have, throughout history, acknowledged private property, which is what the Serbs cannot take, because they are used to occupying other people's property every now and again. The alliance certainly suits the Croats too, and they undoubtedly want to cooperate. On the other hand, it is good for Croatia that we are fighting against the Chetniks together, since we have the misfortune of sharing a border with them.

From Yugoslavs to Bosniaks

[Jeric] You were appointed to the Presidency as representative of the so-called 'others,' and you declared yourself as a Yugoslav. What do you declare yourself now, and what is your relation toward the so-called Yugoslavia?

[Ganic] It is true that I was elected as representative of the 'others,' and I still am, despite the fact that I now represent the Bosniaks a little more, since there are fewer and fewer 'others'. As far as my Yugoslav-ness is concerned, it should be said that we Bosniaks were always fair toward Yugoslavia, and we did not work behind its back. We were the last to stay with Yugoslavia—until Milosevic wanted to create Greater Serbia, which we did not support. Bosnia-Herzegovina was always some kind of glue in this former state—everyone had something in store, and was waiting for their moment to arrive, except for us Bosniaks, of whom there were 20 percent. The Serbs struck out at us because for them it was the last moment, considering that we won over them in science, culture, and the economy. They knew that if they did not attack then we would become so strong that they would no longer be able to impose themselves. It should not be forgotten that the Serbs held all the key positions here.

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However, when the war started, I turned over to the so-called Bosniak side, and stopped being a great Yugoslav, although they say I am not a model Muslim. Now I am a Bosniak.

[Jeric] How can the Federation function if the basic laws are not being passed, such as the laws concerning the army, the central bank, and others? Who is blocking that?

[Ganic] I believe that the Federation Assembly should either hold sessions more often, or, what would be best, hold an ongoing session. There are different views of these laws as far as the Federation is concerned. The Bosniaks experience the Federation as a method of preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina and defeating the Serbs. I proposed to the Croats that we make a federation, and resolve the disputed issues later. This is what happened. Now we will be strengthening the Federation, and we do not like people bothering us about establishing confederate relations with the Republic of Croatia. We told the Croats: There is a certain mistrust between the two peoples, but nothing that could not be resolved.

Zubak and I

[Jeric] The Croats of Sarajevo have been complaining about a specific form of ethnic cleansing, which is that their apartments and jobs are being taken away, and Bosniaks are moving into the apartments and taking over the jobs.

[Ganic] I do not have such information, and the representatives of the Croats in the Presidency have not said anything about it. If they had, I would gladly have joined the discussion.

[Jeric] This information has been verified; it is true.

[Ganic] I do not have any doubts about that, but if we are talking about apartments, it should be said that, after an apartment has been unoccupied for six months, it is declared abandoned. Finally, the Bosniaks—and the Serbs, naturally—are the ones who have lost the most apartments.

[Jeric] Why did you allow as many as 100,000 people to leave Sarajevo?

[Ganic] We cannot tie anyone's hands and forbid them to leave. It is difficult to live here, and everyone who had relatives outside the city has left. We have asked everyone, particularly Croats, to return, and tell us how we should resolve this problem of abandoned apartments. We have people and children on the streets, and we have to provide some accommodation for them. After all, this is what you were doing in Croatia, too.

[Jeric] Why are Croatian citizens recruited into Bosnia-Herzegovina Army formations if there is a Croat brigade in Sarajevo?

[Ganic] We cannot have ethnically pure brigades. There are Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs in them. There are Croats whose professions are needed in the army. We are not keeping citizens of other countries, because we have an army of over 230,000 people. We do need the Croats to fight along with us, this is true. You should know that we will defend this territory in a mortal combat, if necessary.

[Jeric] At the Constituent Federation Assembly session in Zenica, the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] representatives asked that you be federation president instead of Kresimir Zubak. On what legal basis?

[Ganic] On the basis of the Vienna agreement. However, I do not want to discuss this, since I am trying to preserve the strength of the Federation Presidency that Mr. Zubak and I head.

[Box, p 6]

The Rotation

[Jeric] During the war there were comments saying that the conflicts between the Croats and Bosniaks would not have occurred if a Croat had been in the position of president. What do you think about this?

[Ganic] Our president conducted the politics aimed at avoiding conflicts, and he did his best for the conflicts not to take place. As far as leaving the position to someone else is concerned, this is not frequent practice in politics, although the Constitution commits you to do so. Secondly, we knew that the Bosniaks would have greater motivation to fight if the president of the state was a Bosniak. You must understand that we are faced with the question of to be or not to be. Once Bosnia is organized and the Federation starts its first activities, there will surely also be free elections, and rotation at the top of the Presidency on the basis of the elections.

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Serbs 'Fully Complied' With Withdrawal Agreement

LD0501154295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1408 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—The Serb side has fully complied with the agreement on the withdrawal of personnel and heavy weapons in Sector East to the positions they were in prior to NATO's bombing of Udbina airfield, Colonel Damjan Kovacevic, assistant commander of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps of the Serb Army of Krajina, told TANJUG today.

The withdrawal agreement was agreed at the Sarvas-Nemetin border crossing on 23 December last year by Major General Dusan Loncar, commander of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps, and Major General Djuro Decak, commander of the Osijek operational zone of the Army of the Republic of Croatia. They also met at the same border crossing yesterday. The Croatian side claimed on this occasion that it had also complied with the agreement on the withdrawal of personnel and weaponry.

However, this remains to be verified by UN military observers. Just before the New Year holiday, they were not given permission to enter the section of the front controlled by the Croatian side. Gen. Decak yesterday promised that military observers would be able to carry out inspections in all parts of the separation zone.

According to information of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps, the withdrawal of Croatian troops and weapons is most behind schedule in the region of the village of Otoka, near Vinkovci.

If both sides fully comply with the agreement on the withdrawal of personnel and weapons in the separation zone, which encompasses an area extending 1 km either side of the separation line, there will no longer be armed soldiers. At the same time, tanks will be withdrawn 10 km and heavy artillery at least 20 km from the front, as envisaged in the Zagreb cease-fire Agreement.

RSK: No Progress in Pipeline Talks With Croatia

LD0501184695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1506 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Knin, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—No progress was made during the talks between the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] and Croatia in Zagreb on the setting up of a joint oil company, Borislav Mikelic, RSK prime minister and head of the RSK negotiating team, told TANJUG today. [passage omitted]

Mikelic said that there was no doubt that this phase of the negotiating process and the results achieved so far would be considered at the UN Security Council while making a decision on extending the peace forces' mandate.

As far as the opening of the pipeline is concerned, we could not accept the Croatian proposal and they could not accept ours, Mikelic said. Hence, it was agreed that the whole of the pipeline through Krajina should be checked when conditions allow it in order to establish problems and damage, Mikelic said.

According to him, the negotiating process should meanwhile continue in order to find a solution for the setting up of a joint international company. If no such agreement is reached, a solution could be found providing for the exploitation of the pipeline with charges paid to Krajina.

At yesterday's talks in Zagreb, Krajina agreed that the [Zagreb-Lipovac] highway be opened 24 hours a day beginning tomorrow. It is only then that an official announcement on the opening will be made.

In return, Croatia must return to Krajina rotor parts for the Obrovac hydroelectric plant, as specified in the agreement on the opening of the plant. Mikelic said that the parts would be examined today and tomorrow in the Koncar factory in Zagreb. They will be transported to the Obrovac hydroelectric plant as early as Monday [9 January].

Speaking about rail transport, it was agreed that the Zagreb-Vinkovci, Mirkovci-Belgrade, and the Zagreb-Gospic-Knin-Split railway lines would be opened, but no date was set. [passage omitted]

Describing the talks, Mikelic said that everything that could be achieved at the moment had been achieved. Once again Krajina proved to be cooperative and determined to fulfill the obligations stemming from the agreement on the cease-fire and economic relations, on an equal basis and through a negotiating process with Croatia, RSK Prime Minister Mikelic said in conclusion.

Mikelic: Economic Talks Achieved 'Expected' Result

LD0501225095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2130 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Knin, Serb Krajina, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic said Thursday that the Krajina-Croatia economic talks on Wednesday [4 January] had produced the most that could be expected.

Mikelic said that the talks, held in Zagreb, had focused on reopening the oil pipeline and railways shared by Serb Krajina and Croatia. The talks were brokered by international mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who co-chair the international conference on the former Yugoslavia.

Owen and Stoltenberg will report to the United Nations Security Council on the Krajina-Croatia negotiating process and the implementation of the economic accords and the Krajina-Croatia ceasefire agreement.

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Mikelic, who heads the Serb Krajina negotiating team, said the negotiating process and results achieved to date would doubtless be taken into account by the U.N. Security Council in taking a decision on renewing the peacekeepers' mandate in U.N.-protected Serb Krajina.

Mikelic said Serb Krajina had once again shown a readiness to cooperate with Croatia on an equal footing and honor obligations assumed under the economic accords and the ceasefire agreement. [passage omitted]

Mikelic said neither side could agree with the other on the matters of reopening the oil pipeline and of forming a joint commercial oil company. The 735 (?km)-long oil pipeline, opened in 1979, transports oil from the Croatian seaport of Omisalj to the oil refineries in Sisak, Croatia, and Pancevo, Yugoslavia. The pipeline branches off at Sisak and runs on to Hungary and Slovakia. The pipeline, which runs through the Republic of Serb Krajina, Croatia and Yugoslavia, has a rated capacity of transporting 34 million tons of oil a year.

Mikelic said Krajina had given the go-ahead for the non-stop operation of the 396 km-long Belgrade-Zagreb highway as of Friday, when it should be officially reopened. [passage omitted]

Mikelic said Serb Krajina and Croatia officials would be meeting with U.N. force commander in the former Yugoslavia Lt. Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle and U.N. Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The agreement was signed in Zagreb on March 29, 1994. Mikelic said the meeting should deal with all objections and misunderstandings concerning the application of the agreement, specifically those concerning the line of separation and the buffer zone between Serb Krajina and Croatia.

Issue of Croatia, RSK Examined

95BA0069A Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 94 pp 32-33

[Article by Borislav Solesa: "The Dream About the Letter 'U' on the Serbian Peasant's Cap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Are the Serbs in Croatia of use to anyone, or are they a late-20th-century by-product of civilization? In both official Zagreb and official Knin they are facing this question today without coming up with an answer. While at the government level in Zagreb they are pretending not to know what has suddenly happened to their Serbs, in Knin they do not conceal the knowledge that for the capital of Croatia Serbs are only bandits, nothing more than highwaymen. The now almost established, though thin, line of those nostalgic for Yugoslavia on both sides has it that the Serbs must once again love the Croats and vice versa. According to Ujevic's dictum: "I am a Croat because I am a Serb." Those who oppose any Yugoslavism, even if it be based on interest and couched in a treaty, are publishing newspapers in Croatia today where you can find in the nameplate "Damn the Serbs, Wherever They May Be!" On the Serbian sides they are still reassessing how and why the war occurred and what now. Prepare for peace and negotiations, or expect the fire of war to blaze up? CETNICKE NOVINE in Milwaukee recommends to the brothers in the homeland: "Brothers and sisters, let us embrace Mother Serbia; from down at Djevdjelija, up above Subotica, to pleasant Boka...Srpske Moravice..." and sends them a geographical song: "Kordun, Lika, and Banija, Herceg-Bosna, Slavonia, Montenegro, South Serbia, Vojvodina, Dalmatia, the Jadar, Macva, and Tamnava, Sandzak, Boka, and Resava, Levac, Gruza, and Krajina, Stig, Takovo, the Sava, Morava, and Danube valleys, Jasenica and Toplica, Kosanica and Belica, Vranicevo, Dragacevo. Along with Kosovo Metohija, Semberija, and Sumadija—the homeland is SERBIA."

Certain trifling inaccuracies concerning these territories may be viewed as the author's poetic license, but that kind of freedom is not allowed politicians and military men! Provided of course they do not want war to the point where the other side is utterly defeated.

At a time when the views arrived at by the G-7 countries and Russia in Naples and the plan of the Z-4 Contact Group are being debated, it is hard to believe that major new military operations are certain. The bloody clinch that has lasted on the outskirts of Krajina, around Bihac and Petrovac, between the Muslims and Croats on the one side and Krajina and Bosnian Serbs on the other, is perceived more as an incident than a strategy. However many casualties there might be, and there really have been many on all sides, NATO and above all its forces from Aviano, Italy, will hardly allow the Bosnian dance with the devil to go too far.

How Long Is the Serbian Riviera?

The behavior of the government in Zagreb is therefore symptomatic. Not only because they have brought the chetniks to Zagreb and have been negotiating with them about economic normalization of relations and because they have agreed to go to Knin to pay respects to the rebels,but because of the swelling wave of speculation about regulation of relations between Croatia and Krajina. If we omit the usual remarks of official Zagreb that the powerful people in the Big World are perfectly familiar with the situation, but have nevertheless allowed the Serbs and Serbia maximum conquest, then it is possible to spot certain voices that are at least attempting to analyze the present situation in a somewhat different way.

In an ambitious article Radovan Pavic, Croatian military analyst for NOVI LIST in Rijeka, describes the war this way: "In the new situation that has come about since the Washington and Vienna agreement, certain important advantages have been arranged for the Republic of Croatia and the Croats and Muslims, although there are also considerable drawbacks for the Republic of Croatia. On the one hand there is the possibility that the new alliance will make the Croats and Muslims a respectable power factor for the first time, and that is the only thing

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that counts (and at the same time it is the only thing that will permanently discourage the Big World). On the other hand there is the danger to the Republic of Croatia that the Bosnian solution (cantonization in the form of federalization) will also be applied to the problem of its occupied areas, or that the results of conquest will even be recognized, again just as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because recognition and insistence that the Serbs can hold all of 49 percent of the territory is actually recognition of conquest and ethnic cleansing. The second essential shortcoming for the Republic of Croatia is that confederation with a Muslim state obviously makes it more difficult to join the European Union. And to all of this we should add the danger that lies in the possibility of a Serb breakthrough to the Croatian sea being carried out at some point with the help of powerful factors in the Big World."

If we omit certain horoscopic and xenophobic observations, it is clear that the author is expressing the basic dilemma of the Croatian state—how to outwit the Serbs even with an unwelcome ally, and leave them both without territory and without an outlet to the sea. The RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina] is now master of the Carinian Sea (that bay is called a sea, just like the Novigrad Sea, which for a time was under control of the RSK army), and the Bosnian Serbs, from the Srpska republic, do not conceal their intention to stretch the Serbian Riviera from Prevlaka past Molunat to Cavtat. That coastline, which they have already agreed on with representatives of Croatia, according to the statement by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, would be part of a broader deal that would extend the hinterland of Dubrovnik at the expense of Popovo Polje in Trebinje Opstina.

This is at the same time the most burdensome military-political calculation weighing down relations at the moment between the top state leadership of Croatia and the Srpska republic. All the other critical points pertain to differing interests of Croatia and Krajina. Here no less than everything is problematical—even the symbols such as the flag and the crest. The Croatian negotiators and those familiar with the situation in Zagreb say that some members of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] break out in a rash at the mere mention of the possibility of the Serbian flag being a symbol of Krajina or, as this region is viewed from the Banski Dvori, the Zupanija of Knin and Glina.

Why the Dollars and German Marks Are Not Flowing

Almost without exception the Croatian medias, which are under state control, are referring to the plan of the Z-4 Contact Group, which still has not officially emerged, as horrifying, since it allegedly makes too many concessions to the Serbian, Krajina, side. They see two approaches to the work of the Contact Group, the U.S. approach and the Russian approach. The U.S. initiative is said to be consistently favorable to Croatia because it envisages reintegration of Krajina with a high degree of autonomy granted to the RSK. The Russian approach to the problem is altogether different. It envisages a federal relationship between Krajina and Croatia, including the right to confederal linkage with the parent state, Serbia and Montenegro; that is, with Yugoslavia.

This certainly resembles the statement by the Russian diplomat Vitaliy Churkin, who back at the beginning of the year declared that the Croatia-Krajina dispute would be resolved with the formula a state within a state—probably under the influence of the former Soviet and also Russian practice of permissive granting of autonomous or republic status to various oblasts and small nationalities. It seemed altogether normal to Churkin to guarantee a strong status, almost that of a state, to Krajina after a bloody and lengthy war. What frightens Croatian analysts is the fact that Francois Mitterrand, president of France, is coming closer and closer to the Russian view of things and has declared that the borders between the former Yugoslav republics are merely administrative. That is seen in Zagreb as a concession to the Serbian demands.

However fierce the struggle over the status Krajina will win for itself and over the kind of relations it will have with Zagreb, this is still only the tip of the iceberg. The essence of relations lies elsewhere, primarily in the economy. People in the Croatian tourist industry have been saying for more than two years now that every season they are losing between $2-3 billion of expected income because service has not been restored on the railroad line from Zagreb to Split via Plitvice and Knin. If that connection should go into service and should be safe, and when the danger of a new chattering of weapons is eliminated, then the anticipated dollars and German marks would begin to flow. There will be none of all that until an agreement is reached with the Krajina people.

If that rail connection were to go into service, then it would be logical for trains also to begin to run between Belgrade and Zagreb, which is a European connection. According to information one gets from certain diplomats (unofficially of course), all this is envisaged by the plan of the mini-contact group, along with several other interesting details.

In addition to opening railroad routes, the Yugoslav Oil Pipeline, which in Croatia is now called the Adriatic Oil Pipeline, would also be opened: from Krk via Croatia, Slavonia, and Bosanski Brod (which is under control of the Srpska republic) to Serbia. If that is agreed on, it is assumed that Yugoslavia will no longer be subject to the embargo on oil imports, which before the war broke out mainly came across Croatia. Oil from Djeletovci, which is near Mirkovci, would be given special treatment as a Krajina commodity, and the Croatian oil industry would have to pay the full price for it.

The U.S. Dollar Instead of the Kuna

As for automobile traffic, Croatia is particularly interested in the limited-access highway from Novska to

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Okucani, 40 kilometers of which are under Krajina control. That connection could mean a great deal to the Croatian economy, which has been dismembered along regional lines, between the Croatian Zagorje and Slavonia. But in return the Krajina side would have to get the right to use the road to Petrinja via Sisak, which would round out Banija's road network and would make it possible for the ambitious Gavrilovic and a number of other firms to conduct their business.

The kuna, the Croatian currency, could never be legal tender among the Krajina Serbs, and in the mini-contact group they seem to have understood this, and they have therefore proposed some special currency. So as not to tire themselves out too much with the appearance of that currency, the idea is that this would be the U.S. dollar!

Croatia and Krajina would not have joint police forces, but it is envisaged that the stations of law enforcement agencies would be practically parallel, above all in the area of Western Slavonia. This is an extensive ethnic Serb area vacated at the very beginning of the war. The principle of reciprocity would be set down for this and neighboring areas, so that the Serbs could return to the villages near Grubisno Polje, and the Croats to areas near Okucani, Novska, and Lipik.

As for issues of state at the highest level, certain assumptions that have long been in circulation are being confirmed. The Serbs in Croatia and Krajina would again be given the status of a constitutive nationality. It is well-known to those who have followed or have experienced firsthand the Croatia-Krajina war that this is the most sensitive issue, and it is one of the key reasons why the war started. Many Croatian lawyers and party leaders long ago spoke out that the Croatian people would not share sovereignty with anyone, least of all the Serbs, who did not prove to be loyal in the time of realization of the millennial dream of a Croatian state. Incidentally, it is clear from the writings of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman that this is the case, if confirmation is needed that this is one of the most difficult of the many difficult issues between Croatia and Krajina. The leitmotif running through Franjo Tudjman's entire opus is moving away from the Serbian element in almost every way.

Tudjman's family did not, however, manage to distance itself from the Serbian element, so that one can speak about his ethnic impurity, in that his son-in-law, Stevan Kosutic, is a Serb, so that his grandchildren are ethnically mixed. If after the war with Krajina Tudjman has finally realized that he should change his approach, he will have to take the responsibility himself. It is a fact that his statements in this regard have become more and more mild, although there is still quite a bit of fire in them. Thus, on 19 October, in a speech during the Poseidon 94 military exercise, he sent a message to the rebellious Serbs (just as he did in the Bandira 94 spring exercises) that Croatia is ready to impose its sovereignty by force on the territories the aggressors took from Croatia.

It seems that the question of Croatia's sovereignty, which Tudjman wants to preserve as something exclusively Croatian, is the center of the dispute. If he gives in here, Tudjman is threatened by an opposition already up in arms and saying that he has sold out Croatian interests in carrying out a bad policy. They are especially attacking him for fighting the Muslims. It is said that the battles between them and the Muslims resulted in the displacement of 200,000 Croats and a strengthening of Serbian positions both in the Srpska republic and also in Krajina. Removal of some of the sanctions from Yugoslavia is a result, it is being said in Croatian opposition circles, of precisely that wrong policy and major strategic mistakes. Nor is that all.

How the Pope Has Replaced Broz

There are many signs that the pope's visit to Croatia was motivated by concern for Croatian, i.e. Catholic, interests in Bosnia. Many analyses say that this is why the pope delivered a speech full of tolerance and an appeal for understanding of those close to us. Since the speech was delivered in Zagreb, it is clear that those close to the Croats are the Serbs. The pope all but began to speak in Broz's style about brotherhood and unity. This is well-known, but to many people it is not clear why it happened. But it is clear.

The two largest Catholic seats in the Balkans are Zagreb and Vrh Bosne (the Slovene, Serbian and Croatian, and Christian name for Sarajevo and the broad region around it). As is well-known, the Vatican has never given up its missions in the non-Catholic countries. Vrh Bosne, Bosna Srebrna, Franciscan Bosnia, or Central Bosnia (these are names for the same space) were the center of a Catholic campaign towards the Drina and beyond. It was collaboration with the Serbian army and the two-faced relationship to the Muslims in central Bosnia that gave the advantage to the Croatian Defense Council. There is knowledge that Serbian tanks, guns, and logistical support brought key victories and establishment of Croatian authority in those areas.

The army of the undefined Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna could not withstand the fight with the Muslims it entered into, and Croats moved out of those areas en masse. That is the reason why the pope delivered that particular speech, which in many circles was seen as the speech of a man who is losing something that he had and is very concerned. If we are mindful of the tendency of Vatican policy to be turned toward the future and to anticipate things, it is clear that the pope wanted at least to get back what he had: peace in the regions around Zagreb and the return of Catholics to central Bosnia.

That is why the top Croatian leadership was publicly scolded in front of several hundred thousand Croats who were listening enraptured to the head of the Catholic Church. No one seems to have asked why this change of approach has now occurred after the independence of the Republic of Croatia was hastily recognized by none other than the Vatican and Pope Wojtyla. Regardless of the

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necessary caution when the Danaians come bearing gifts, it is clear that at this point those moves by the Vatican, in particular the pope's speech in Zagreb, are helping to calm down the situation in the South Slav regions, whether they be Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim....

What could adversely affect the calming down of the war on the soil of the former Yugoslavia at decisive points are the relatively rapid and surprising successes of Muslim and Croatian military units in battles south and southeast of Bihac and especially the entry of Croatian soldiers into Kupres. The conquest of almost 300 sq km of territory where the Serbs have been the ethnic majority has encouraged the top military leadership of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Muslim army), the Croatian Defense Council, and the Republic of Croatia. Cheered by those victories after a long, dry wartime period in which the army of the Srpska republic was unsurpassable, the top Croatian and Muslim Government and military leadership might think that successes on the battlefield could recur constantly. That would be a misfortune that would result in a horrible heating up of the war, which was dying out.

Even though these are military advances primarily by Muslim soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they are rejoicing in official Zagreb. Everything that breaks down the myth of Serbian military superiority is helpful to possible future Croatian gains in the diplomatic and military areas.

Dear Friends, Where Are You?

Counting on these new military successes, Croatian statesmen can only become more entrenched in negotiations with representatives of Krajina and Yugoslavia, which are taking place right now. During the contacts in Knin the Croatian negotiators showed no particular superiority because of the military successes referred to, but it was clear that they were not softening their hard stand towards the Krajina people in any respect. The most offered by any official Croatian representative to the Krajina people came from Dusan Bilandzic, assistant to Zvonimir Markovic in the Croatian office in Belgrade. He said that the most the Serbs would get is a status equal to the Swedes in Finland or the Tyroleans in Austria. It is taken for granted that this would be carried out under international supervision. In 11 opstinas where the Serbs had an absolute ethnic majority in the 1981 and 1991 censuses, they would have the right to their own police, courts, flag, and crest. In other cities where the Krajina Serbs have a relative majority or are in the minority, they would have the right to cultural autonomy. That would then apply to the local communities of Kozari Bok and Kozari Put in Zagreb, where the Serbs are the majority nationality.

We will see how realistic that is. As in everything that resembles a European and civilized solution, the South Slavs find their own way, that will probably also be the case now. That way will certainly be quite steep and difficult, if it is found at all.

What do citizens of Zagreb think about all this? "It is not clear to anyone what our top leadership wants. After so much euphoria and strange ethnic rapture, to which I myself also succumbed, I admit it, I do not know what to think. I only know that I am fed up with it all. I would like it if we finally made peace and if some of my Serbian friends, men and women, would come back as soon as possible. That is where they belong. I know quite well that the Krajina people could have been custodians of a better and stronger Croatia if only the policy of the government had been a bit more attentive. This way, our citizens have become our enemies. I cannot stand that. I often talk about this with my friends and relatives. They are thinking along the same lines. They can hardly wait for us to travel normally and meet our old comrades from Serbia and Bosnia," a Croatian colleague explained to me the other day, asking that I not mention her name in the newspaper.

Her colleague had these thoughts about a political solution to the problem: "It has gone too far. Both have promised too much. We have all made fools of ourselves. Every concession made towards the UNPAs [UN Protected Areas] in Croatia, which you call Krajina, is perceived in Croatia as a deception, since they said that it would be different.... I do not know how it will be worked out either. I only know that Europe and the world are fooling around with us, and that our statesmen have become utterly useless. They are going around, they are taking money from suspicious sources, and they are lying to us. We have all been deceived." He did not want his name to appear in the newspaper either, since he is going back to Zagreb and wants to avoid possible unpleasantness.

One thing becomes obvious, and that is that Krajina and Croatia are more and more becoming less and less masters of their own destiny. Croatia's desired independence has been turned into a role of service to NATO and Europe, and there is no real possibility of the most powerful taking it seriously or treating it on an equal footing. Krajina, on the other hand, is pinched between its Croatian and Muslim neighbors, and has no real possibility of joining the Srpska republic in the way they would like. The time for compromise and political trading is coming, and this is a field on which tricks are taken for granted. It is an honest game of trying to deceive one another.

Istria Membership in European Organization

95BA0071A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Dec 94 pp 6-7

[Interview with Dr. Loredana Bogliun-Debeljuh, deputy zupan of Istrian Zupanija and leader of the Istrian Democratic Conference, by Edi Jurkovic; place and date not given—first paragraph is SLOBODNA DALMACIJA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Istria Zupanija delegation's participation in the annual General Assembly of European Regions in Strasbourg, the European body that has*

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accepted Istria's membership, although Croatia, the parent state, is still waiting at Europe's door, is without doubt an important event. In that connection we asked for an interview with Dr. Loredana Bogliun-Debeljuh, Istrian deputy zupan and distinguished leader of the IDS [Istrian Democratic Conference]; her activity to date outside our country's borders has not gone unnoticed. The other day she returned from Rome, where she presented the project "Istria—Euroregion" at the headquarters of the incumbent movement Forza Italia and obtained support for it, which evoked numerous adverse public comments here. We should also add that although it was announced that Dr. Loredana Bogliun-Debeljuh would go to Strasbourg, she is not going, but she did not want to speak publicly about why she is not going.

[Jurkovic] Please comment first on the meeting of the General Assembly of European Regions in Strasbourg. What does Istria Zupanija's membership in that body mean for Istria and what does it mean for Croatia?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] For Istria it is first of all a great political victory, I would even say an authentic political triumph, without exaggeration. This membership has confirmed the correctness of our political program and of the policy we have been conducting to promote the harmonious life of diverse ethnic groups in Istria, and above all to protect the rights of the Italian component. It is at the same time a sign of recognition for the policy of peace we have been following out of a desire to succeed in integrating into the European area as soon as possible as active factors in the process of European integration. This is also a confirmation to the citizens of Istria who supported us in the plebiscite that the IDS does not make empty promises. Within the broader strategy Istria is promoting Croatia in Europe. At the actual induction into the Assembly of European Regions, which took place in Tuscany, Florence to be exact, we were introduced as a "model region" in Croatia, and it was said that what we are doing in Istria is what Europe also wants. These, then, are European standards.

We Are Open to the World

[Jurkovic] How will Istria be presented in Strasbourg?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] We will first of all present our experiences. Our goal is to work toward further regionalization to divide Croatia into its historical regions, which would respect the independent identity of the various native areas. That would certainly contribute to economic and cultural development and to bringing Croatia closer to Europe. Another reason why our presence in Strasbourg is very important to Croatia is that we are being asked to make suggestions for resolving that crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

[Jurkovic] That would be your political assessment, but what are the practical consequences of Istria's membership in the Assembly of European Regions?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] All possible forms of communication are being opened up to us—from cultural ties to economic cooperation to promotion of tourism. Istria has always been open to the world, but this situation means that we can communicate directly at the regional level with all the regions that are members of the Assembly of European Regions, regardless of whether their parent states are members of the EU [European Union] or not.

[Jurkovic] Istria is a member of the Assembly, although Croatia has still not been accepted into the European groups of states. Are there other cases in which a region has been accepted although the parent country is still not a member of the EU?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] There certainly are! At the moment the organization has 260 member regions, among them regions in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine. But as for regions from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Istria is for now the only one that has been accepted. But let me go back to interregional cooperation. Communication is not merely symbolic, but also practical. We can apply for and participate in EU programs intended for regions of the countries of eastern and central Europe, for their development and convergence. To be still more specific, that cooperation is not really very simple or short-term, but the rule is that the region must have at least two partners in countries that are EU members. Thus, Istria has a partner in the Italian region of Tuscany; they are our partners, but we also cooperate with the regions of Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia concerning the program Interreg for border regions, because we border on the sea. We are now also preparing an effort to put together information about Istria, an economic map, which is necessary if we want to become involved in and compete for European programs.

[Jurkovic] As a member of the Assembly of European Regions, can Istria help other Croatian zupanijas to join the association?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] Yes, we will certainly make an effort in that regard, but objectively it will be very difficult for us, since the present regionalization of Croatia does not meet the European standards and rules for membership in the Assembly of European Regions.

[Jurkovic] How is it, then, that the Istria Zupanija has been accepted?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] We managed to prove that we as a zupanija, even though the region of Istria is divided among three states, and although we have problems that are dealt with at the level of those states, not at the level of the region, we do have the shape of a region with its own identity, even though Opatija, Cres, and Losinj belong to the Primorje and Goranje Zupanija. Should Croatia be regionalized according to European criteria, that would change little for Istria; we were able to prove that, and that is why we were accepted. As for the other regions in Croatia, they were discussed in a meeting of the bureau in Florence. The remark was made that

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Croatia as a state does not have true regionalization, and in the end it was spelled out that an effort should be made in the direction of regionalizing Croatia according to historical regions. I do not know whether it is possible for Dalmatia, for instance, which is divided among several zupanijas, to be accepted as Dalmatia. If the zupanijas were to submit a joint application by mutual agreement, there probably would be some chance.

Alto-Adige as an Example

[Jurkovic] You recently presented the project "Istria—Euroregion" in Rome. What is the difference between that region and the region that has now become formally a member of the Assembly of European Regions?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] We see ourselves within the broader region as a locomotive pulling along the other parts. Next spring we are organizing the World Congress of Istrians, with representatives coming from opstinas throughout Istria and all clubs of Istrians all over the world. We want to integrate Istria and create a European region throughout the entire area of Istria regardless of borders, since Istria is a single entity and has its own identity. The difference, then, is that the Euroregion envisages the entire extent of Istria from Muggia via Koper, Izola, and Piran to the largest part, which is located in Croatia, including the areas of Opatija, Cres, and Losinj. Such regions already exist in Western Europe, and they have their own legislative and administrative powers at the regional level, through which they solve problems specific to the region, respecting the laws of the parent states. Thus the project for Istria as a Euroregion does not infringe on the sovereignty of the various states, but is rather aimed at solving specific regional problems. The regime at the border is offensive to us. For centuries we have had no border in Istria, and it is a real shock to us. Since our region has been divided among three states, we think it would be ideal to organize ourselves similarly to Trentino-Alto Adige, since they have two provinces with a high degree of autonomy, and then a joint assembly.

[Jurkovic] How do you expect to carry out that project? It does after all affect the territory of no less than three states.

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] The first step is for Croatia and Slovenia to work out the status of Istria so that both the Croatian and Slovene parts of Istria have the same status of regional autonomy. The second step is a treaty between Croatia and Slovenia to create that transborder region, and the third step would be to include Italy as well and to sign an agreement among the three states. A possible fourth step would be for Istria thereafter to become part of the macroregion of Central Europe.

[Jurkovic] Do you think that is realistic?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] Hardly, so long as the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] is in power, but we need to make an effort with the democratic forces in Croatia, because I think there is a constructive trend in keeping with modern European ideas. People should be familiarized with regionalism; it should not be treated as a bugbear.

[Jurkovic] Are you mindful of the present relations between Croatia and Slovenia, which are as tense as can be precisely along the Istrian part of the border?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] We are concerned because there is a big question of how this will be worked out, and we are afraid that it all may come crashing down on our heads. The important thing for us is to preserve the peace here among Istrians on both sides of the border. We have ties of friendship and kinship, and this is a border region with a specific way of life. Everything that is happening now results from the politicization of Slovenia's undocumented and unfounded claims and from a lack of appreciation for our Istrian arguments. In the final analysis we know where the bed of the Dragonja is, and also where it was moved. If it was up to us in Istria, it could all be worked out, because there is an agreement in effect among the mayors of cities and opstinas on both sides of the border in which they advocate cooperation and agreement. There have never been disputes among us.

[Jurkovic] You said yourself that the Euroregion project acts in Croatia like a locomotive. Do you have a partner in Slovenia for that project?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] The Koper area is a small region, but we have the IDS organized even there, and other regional parties have also organized, as well as specific local slates of candidates in the recent elections.

[Jurkovic] I must also ask about Muggia, the little town in Italy that is also involved in the project?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] In Muggia we have a nucleus, a group that has been active and has had ties with us from the very beginning. Under its bylaws it can operate as a club of the IDS, but it should not be forgotten that a third of the population of Trieste comes from Istria.

The Imprint of Istrianism

[Jurkovic] Don't you think that your initiative is dangerous at this juncture? I recently read that one of the sponsors of your project is Forza Italia, Berlusconi's party, which mainly attracts right-wing forces in Italy. Would you like to comment on that?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] I simply do not accept those attacks. Since Istria is divided among three states, our strategy is to work with all the parties that can help us. Three weeks ago we had a meeting in Buje with the Italian Reformists (PDS), which is like our SDP [Social Democratic Party]. That is, the left and the opposition. So why should we not talk to Forza Italia as well?

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[Jurkovic] The Program for Reconstruction and Development of Istria Zupanija of the Zupanija Committee of the Istrian HDZ and Dom [Home], Society for Reconstruction and Development of Istria, was presented last week. It was mentioned in this context that "promotion of Istrianism is an anti-Croatian effort." How do you assess that, since you frequently appeal to Istrianism?

[Bogliun-Debeljuh] They are mistaken. We are talking about a cultural concept that characterizes and identifies the citizens of Istria and the feeling of belonging to a region, but we do not get into theorizing about ethnic background because we feel that those concepts and ideologies are a thing of the past. We have to become European in the sense of our evaluation of various cultural values. The distinctive thing about Istria is that it is an ethnically fluid space whose inhabitants are Croats, Italians, Slovenes, and Istrians, who represented about 20 percent in the last census. They are not a monoethnic category; they speak diverse languages and dialects. The aim of the HDZ is to Croatize Istria by promoting the conventional model of the nation-state, which is not flexible towards pluralistic communities. That is my basic objection to their program. A modern Croatian state must promote itself with its own creative values, not by imposing ideological views and manipulating the ethnos. The basic imprint of Istria is the imprint of Istrianism, which has its Croat, Slovene, and Italian parts, and it is not possible to promote only the Croatian part and avoid the Italian part, because the autochthonous nature of the Italians in Istria is a basic element of Istria, and they cannot be marginalized. The HDZ program unfortunately takes exactly that line, as though the Italians came here the day before yesterday, and they will be granted certain rights, but in practice they will be second-class citizens.

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Federal

Bozovic Cited on Importance of Lifting Sanctions

LD0501231295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2232 GMT 5 Jan 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslavia's Lower House Speaker Radoman Bozovic and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Parliamentary Assembly Vice-President Willy Wimmer underlined Thursday the significance of Yugoslavia's reintegration into international institutions, including the OSCE.

A government statement said Wimmer, who is also deputy of the Christian-Democrat Union in the Bundestag, was on an official visit to Yugoslavia.

The statement said that during the talks with Wimmer, Bozovic urged the reviving of parliamentary cooperation between Yugoslavia and Germany, which would contribute to improved understanding between the two countries on the whole.

He also informed Wimmer about the current situation in the former Yugoslavia. In this context, he pointed out the significance of the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia and of the pressures from the international community towards attaining peace in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He urged resolving of all disputed questions through talks, proceeding from the international Contact Group for Bosnia plan.

The several-day visit to Belgrade of the senior official of the Organization for Security and Coooperation in Europe preceded the arrival of the OSCE parliamentary assembly president, set for next week.

Wimmer on Thursday told newsmen in Belgrade that the OSCE parliamentary assembly was trying to restore its mission for monitoring human rights in Yugoslavia.

After talking to opposition Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic, he said it was important for the OSCE, not only as regards the situation in the Balkans, that there was stability, respect for human rights and the existence of normal political conditions such as was customary in Europe and the world. In this way, Wimmer indirectly supplied the answer to the question whether renewed work of the OSCE mission in Yugoslavia meant also the return of Yugoslavia to this organization.

Djindjic said he proposed the return of the OSCE mission to Yugoslavia be carried out simultaneously with the restoration of Yugoslavia's full membership to this organization. He said that if this was not possible, then establishing dialogue at different levels should be opened so as to renew mutual trust. He added it was more important to restore mutual trust between the OSCE and Yugoslavia than to renew the OSCE mission in Yugoslavia.

The OSCE mandate to Yugoslavia expired in the summer of 1993 and talks on prolonging it were not renewed since the Yugoslav Government insisted cooperation with this organization could unfold only under the principle of equality, this being the basic principle in international relations.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was suspended from the work of the OSCE (then CSCE) in the summer of 1992, after the United Nations imposed comprehensive sanctions against it over its alleged involvement in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Wimmer also held talk with leader of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement Vuk Draskovic.

A party statement said that Draskovic pointed out the lifting of sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia could only serve to encourage the forces of peace and democratic renewal. Sanctions suited only the forces of war and forces which used isolation from the democratic world to exercise their arbitrariness, said Draskovic.

Perisic Denies Army's Involvement in Bosnia

AU0601114295 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 29 Dec 94 pp 5-7

[News conference by General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, on 27 December 1994 at the Central Club of the Yugoslav Army: "Defense Is Not a Military Secret"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Perisic] Ladies and gentlemen, journalists, I welcome you with great pleasure, hoping that today's working meeting, as with all subsequent meetings, evolves as well as possible, to our mutual satisfaction. In the Yugoslav and foreign media so far there have been around 10,000 reports on the Yugoslav Army, which speaks for the great interest. We have not expected idealization, but rather that those reports represent the Army to our people, our society, as it is. Even last year we recognized this as the greatest problem: If a situation is represented in a much better light than it really is, then we deceive ourselves, as well as our people.

I would like to underline that we made it our task to improve the image of our Army. This has been accomplished owing first to the well-thought out, diligent work by all the leading structures in the Yugoslav Army. Also, some opinion polls on trust have shown that the army tops the list both in Serbia and in Montenegro.

Furthermore, we made it our task to improve the Army's ability to resist, that is, to devise defense mechanisms against harmful influences from abroad and from society. I think that we have succeeded in that. In extremely difficult conditions the army has succeeded in

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developing and preserving its combat readiness, protecting the security and integrity of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], and has prevented any endangerment of the country's security.

We also made it our task for the Army, together with other elements of the society, to be a stabilizing factor that eliminates any conditions favorable to the outbreak of civil war. The architects of the new world order set out to destroy our people's state, but their first goal was the destruction of the army. Of course, they intended to accomplish this by deploying as few troops of their own as possible. Unfortunately, they accomplished most of their intentions in former Yugoslavia without deploying a single soldier of their own, but rather by using local soldiers in the region. However, in the past three or four years we have succeeded in thwarting their ambitions. [passage omitted]

Let me conclude: The combat readiness of the Yugoslav Army is at such a high level that any surprises are precluded, which makes it an important factor of stability. Which is to say, if someone should happen to make a grab for our territory, the Army will be able to deter him.

After the introductory address Gen. Perisic answered journalists' questions.

[Milutin Niciforovic of POLITIKA EKSPRES] How is the revitalization of the cadre in the Yugoslav Army progressing? What is happening with Gen. Boro Ivanovic, who is suspected of involvement in criminal real estate activities? What do you think about the direct denouncement of the military justice administration following the trial of Gen. Trifunovic? And how can a man who was twice convicted head the Justice Administration?

[Perisic] Any organization must revitalize if it thinks about its future, which also applies to the Yugoslav Army. As for Gen. Ivanovic, I swore long ago that I would not speak about anyone in the public, nor denounce anybody in particular. The army, being a part of the society, is certainly not exempt from negative occurrences.

Gen. Trifunovic was tried by the court martial. Courts martial are independent and the General Staff has no influence over them whatsoever. I have nothing to add to this. During the first trial I was supposed to give my expert opinion, because I am the only general in Yugoslavia who had been in a similar situation, while besieged in Zadar. I refused to do that, because I was very subjective about it.

Finally, the Justice Administration is headed by a man who was convicted and who served his time for a car accident. I just wonder whether people who have served their time deserve to be excommunicated from society. [passage omitted]

[Dusan Vojvodic of Belgrade TV] How far have you gone with professionalization in the Yugoslav Army, and what is the response among conscripts to service in the Yugoslav Army?

[Perisic] The Yugoslav Army is composed of its professional segment, made up of senior officers and civilian employees, and its changeable part, made up of recruits and conscripts. Many do not understand what is meant by professionalization; they thought we would create some new, completely professional army. You know yourself that even wealthier nations than ours cannot afford that. When we speak of professional army, we do not have in mind an army in which all the soldiers are professional soldiers, but rather that Yugoslav Army personnel should perform their jobs professionally. Of course, we wanted to have enough reserve soldiers to ensure a higher level of combat readiness. However, we did not achieve what we wanted for one reason—we did not have the money to pay those people. The budget is relatively small compared to our needs, and if you cannot ensure salaries at least as high as in other organizations, then people's interest in this profession is relatively weak.

The Yugoslav Army is now undergoing the transition from an ideological Yugoslav People's Army to a professional army. We do not have enough means to accomplish a high standard and everything else that we need to take in more professionals. We have abandoned ideology. Now we are in a relatively difficult situation that, without the help of you, journalists, and other segments of society, can scarcely be overcome.

I have analyzed the response to army service—in every instance it is 100 percent. Whereas, for instance, in the Russian Federation the response among recruits is 20 to 25 percent. Also in other armies the response is much lower than in our Army. The response among conscripts varies from region to region, and we are not satisfied with it. We have taken the following attitude: Members of a unit should be mobilized only once, as Misic [not further identified] would say, rather than a hundred times because that makes it difficult for us to summon them when we really need them.

[Mladjen Sladojevic of TV Novi Sad] Is the Partnership for Peace the newest strategy of the West and how can it affect the FRY?

[Perisic] The Partnership for Peace is a category of certain relations that we are still not quite familiar with, and I believe its architects are not either. It is a new category of relations that can be proven only through experience. If, for instance, Albania joins the partnership, that would be rather ridiculous in view of the extent to which its military infrastructure is developed.

I think that it is an attempt of somehow perfidiously substituting for something that is gone, that is, the balance between the two blocs; its real design is to enable

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its main architect to take control over the space that previously came under some other military factor or alliance.

[Dragan Milutinovic of Belgrade TV] When will the Yugoslav Army hand over the war crimes documents to the relevant institutions, and will legal action be taken against those who released the war criminals from Vukovar and other regions?

[Perisic] The former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] documents inherited by the Yugoslav Army have been remanded to the institutions that ought to have them. There is no embargo in this respect. Whether they have been given to someone who wants to make a fortune out of the Serbian people's blood—well, this is a real question. I am not referring to anyone in particular. The Yugoslav Army documents about the war in general have been forwarded to those who ought to have them.

I did not participated in the release of war criminals and neither did the Yugoslav Army. Those who did are people who are well-known to you, so you should ask them what happened and how it happened. How do I view war crimes? Look, this is a civil war. There is no cliche for any civil war. The world first denied that a civil war was being waged in former Yugoslavia, and the prevalent attitude was that it was aggression by Serbia against others, whereas now it has finally admitted it was a civil war. The reason there are no norms in civil war is clear because you cannot find two identical civil wars. The conflict in Slovenia, that was not even a war, cannot be compared with what was happening in Croatia, which again cannot be compared with what has been happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I decry all those who commit war crimes. Being a participant myself in the war, I once said, answering the question whether I consider myself to be a war criminal: "I would have been one had I not with my decisions preserved the lives of our sons, for whom I was responsible."

[Vladimir Matevski of FRANKFURTER NACHRICHTEN] Would you please comment on the budget increase for the Republican Police.

[Perisic] I am the chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army. I struggle and manage the budget for the Yugoslav Army to achieve such a level of combat readiness that it permits all other institutions of society to perform their tasks in peace. How big is the budget for the police? First, I do not know, and second, it is none of my business. The institutions that make those decisions probably give a good deal of thought to whether it should be increased or decreased.

[Novica Andric of TANJUG] How do you assess the situation on FRY's borders toward former Yugoslav republics and has there been any violation of our territorial waters by NATO forces?

[Perisic] All the borders are protected in accordance with current needs. The greatest number of incidents took place on the border with Albania, but in recent times there have been fewer of them. There were also incidents on the border with Macedonia, but right now there are almost none. We have some problems on the border with Croatia, particularly in the region of Prevlaka, whereas in Srem there are almost no problems of note. On the border with the Srpska republic there are no incidents, and there have never been any, except for certain undefined issues. Because, let me say this conditionally, there occurred an artificial division of many things that cannot be divided. For instance, children from the territory of Serbia go to school in the Serbian Republic and vice versa, or people own land on both sides of the border, and so forth. At Prevlaka many things have not been defined. Cape Ostri, being the place that stands out the most and where there used to be an army camp, should be under UN control. Despite this the zone is sometimes violated. When it comes to incidents between the army of the Srpska republic and the Croatian Army, then the territory of the FRY is occasionally violated, always under pretext of an oversight; the official explanation is that the intention was to attack the territory of the Srpska republic.

As for territorial waters, they have not been endangered by NATO forces. Occasionally, Croatian citizens violate the border while sailing. However, this in no case endangers the security of our territorial waters. [passage omitted]

[Aneta Mihajlovic of NTV Studio B] What is your relationship with Gen. Mladic like?

[Perisic] Gen. Mladic and I are acquaintances and war comrades. Our relationship is quite normal. We are two professional officers who struggle to prevent the physical extermination of our own people.

[Milovan Drecun of Belgrade TV] How do you and the Yugoslav Army view the solution to the Serbian national question? By the way, some foreign media report that the border with the Srpska republic is closed, but that the Yugoslav Army and its leader disregard this and use it for their own interests.

[Perisic] The border with the Srpska republic is closed. There are various insinuations and stories. There were many delegations, there was even a top U.S. official delegation, and all of them wonder how long the Serbs can endure. Let me answer: The former JNA, that is, the former Yugoslavia, considered Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a strategic region, and therefore it developed heavy industry and accumulated stocks of deadly weapons and equipment there. Second, the JNA did not dissolve, but rather came to the border of the people [as published] that accepted it as its own army. The JNA armed people who had been taken from other regions with weapons—except for individuals about whom there was a lot of talk here as well—and trained them to use those systems; now those people are waging a war. On the other hand,

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the Serbs in the Srpska republic had plenty of weapons themselves, for which they had been apportioning money from their salaries for many years. Second, they have been at war for the third year running and have become experts in manufacturing many things. Third, they have at their disposal the greatest stocks of weapons that existed in former Yugoslavia. Therefore they are capable of waging war as long as it is necessary. And they are determined to wage war until the final victory.

Therefore, all the insinuations, such as the one claiming that the Serbs were about to be defeated but the FRY supplied them with certain systems with which they were shooting down aircraft, are nonsense. Not a single member of the Yugoslav Army is on the territory of the Srpska Republic or the republic of Serbian Krajina, and we are not supplying them with anything other than humanitarian aid. They have all they want, of course, not as much as they should because of the enemy, but, after all, we also do not have many things we need ourselves.

As for the Serbian national question and its settlement, you had better ask politicians. If the state should call on it, the army, as its instrument, will comply with state policy.

Poor Analysis Behind Restrictive Monetary Policy

LD0501200695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1554 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—There will be no inflationary budget and this will inevitably lead to a reduction in the overall state burden, which is at present stifling the economy, Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, governor of the Yugoslav National Bank, said at a meeting today with about 40 representatives of Investbanka's largest borrowers.

On the other hand, there is a need for a thorough analysis of the structurally weak points in the economy since correct diagnosis is crucial if they are to be eliminated. Many problems arise as a result of wrong analysis, and this has often forced us to resort to a restrictive monetary policy, the governor said.

His conclusion was prompted by a statement by Investbanka Director General Nikola Stanic, who said that contrary to what our economists were saying and despite the claims that they were the economy's sorest point, it was large enterprises that repaid their debts most promptly. [passage omitted]

Avramovic said that lending to agriculture was our main stumbling block because we failed to rely on market mechanisms in financing this sphere of economy.

Contrary to expectations, we always become stuck after a good harvest because, in an attempt to get the state to shoulder the burden, most of the wheat is sent to state reserves rather than to mills and bakeries. [passage omitted]

According to Avramovic, the slight easing of sanctions will help to increase exports but, at the same time, it will be necessary to encourage savings and to open doors to foreign capital to increase investment and develop the country, the governor said in conclusion. He told the meeting that the country's investment program was being prepared by a working group because "there is no one else prepared to do it."

Serbia

Officials Meet Russian Delegation; Hope for Peace

LD0501210095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2039 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—Serbian parliament official Djordje Basic said Thursday that the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was working for peace in the former Yugoslavia.

Speaking with a Russian and Belarus parliamentary delegation in Belgrade, Basic, deputy speaker of the Serbian legislature, said that 'every well-intentioned initiative for peace is welcome.' Basic said that the initiative for Bosnia of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter had resulted in a 'positive move forward.'

He said this was the time for Russia and Belarus to join in the effort in order that the four-month cessation of hostilities might be extended and questions in dispute be dealt with at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.

Bosnian Serbs and Muslims signed an agreement for a four-month (?cessation) of hostilities on Dec. 31, which went into effect throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina on Jan. 1.

Slobodan Jovanovic, chairman of the parliamentary foreign policy commission, who also had talks with the delegation, said that an end to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a condition for discussing questions in dispute in peace.

Jovanovic said Yugoslavia had always urged an equal treatment of all sides and equal respect for the interests of all peoples, including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He thanked the Russian parliament for its contribution to the efforts for a just settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Lifting of Sanctions Urged

LD0501222895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2108 GMT 5 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 5 (TANJUG)—Russian and Belarus parliamentarians urged Thursday

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in Belgrade a speedy and full lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The delegation's members said this in talks with Serbia's opposition Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjic, who had invited them to Yugoslavia.

The delegation head and president of the Russian All-People's Alliance, Sergey Baburin, said the visit was aimed at contributing to the normalization of situation in the former Yugoslavia and restoring just peace. He said the visit was an attempt to effect "certain corrections of Russia's current foreign line."

He noted that the delegation goes Friday to Pale, the political seat of Bosnian Serbs, at the invitation of Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic.

Baburin said the truce in Bosnia was encouraging and that he thought that the Serbs, who remained outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, should be secured the right to self-determination.

In his view, the international community has prematurely recognized the former Yugoslav republics, especially Bosnia- Herzegovina, but also noted that to admit a mistake should entail correcting it.

Djindjic said he saw the visit in the context of Russia's further active participation in the Bosnia peace process, because Russian diplomacy, as he said, has by isolating Bosnian Serbs effected in a way isolation of the Serbs in the negotiating process.

Assessing Russia's resuming again an active role in resolving the Bosnia crisis, he urged the establishment of some sort of parallel diplomacy between Moscow and Pale, but, as he said, not as an obstruction of Russia's official policy, but in accord with it, as a supplement to it.

The Russian and Belarus parliamentarians were Thursday also guests of the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia, whose leader Vojislav Kostunica said the situation in the former Yugoslavia was "very similar to Russian reality."

Just as a large number of Russians remained outside the borders of the Russian Federation, he said, so a large number of Serbs found themselves outside the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Kostunica said the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina in fact struggled for their sovereignty and for international recognition. He cited Karadzic that the Bosnian Serb republic could "remain in some sort of confederal link with the Muslim-Croat federation, but only temporarily."

In his view, no state could be made out of something that has never been a state "by the peoples who are at war and who refuse to live in this state." "At this time, we hope that the latest initiative by the Bosnian Serb leadership will enable arriving at a just and lasting peace," he said.

Head of the Russian and Belarus delegation Baburin said the visit was also aimed at continuing efforts by the "deputies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus for just peace to be reached in Yugoslavia." The misfortunes of Russia and Serbia were very similar, because they stemmed from the break-up of a single state so that the "methods of treatment" were also similar, he said.

The multiparty parliamentary delegation also met representatives of the opposition parliamentary Serbian Radical Party. During the talks, as set out, an accord in views was confirmed on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and on the ways for weathering it.

Parties Welcome Four-Month Truce in Bosnia

LD0501224695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2135 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 5 (TANJUG)—Four-month truce in Bosnia would enable seeking political solution to the conflict under favorable circumstances and without loss of human life.

Vice-president of the new Democracy Party Cedomir Mirkovic also said Thursday that too much optimism would be premature because the necessary accord on a concrete political solution was still lacking.

He told a press conference his party believed that the warring sides accept the basis of the Contact Group for Bosnia plan, which placed all the sides in the conflict in similar, nearly equal conditions.

Mirkovic objected that the international community on the one hand recognized the significance of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the peace process, but on the other retained sanctions against it since May 1992.

The opposition Serbian Radical Party, too, assessed that the accord on the four-month cessation of hostilities in Bosnia signed on Monday was a step toward lasting peace.

Its Vice-President Tomislav Nikolic told a press conference Thursday that, nevertheless, the Muslim and Croatian sides had previously also observed truce in the wintertime only to violate it in the spring.

The signing of the accord on cessation of hostilities in Bosnia was also welcomed Wednesday by the opposition Democratic Party of Serbia and the Civic Alliance of Serbia.

Data on Private TV Stations in Serbia

95BA0080B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 9 Dec 94 pp 28-29

[Article by S.I.: "Who Is Who"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] **NTV [Independent Television] Studio B (Belgrade)**—Radiobroadcasting Enterprise Studio B, joint-stock company; in operation since 16 November 1990; broadcasts about 10 hours of programming daily. Produces most of its own programs (about 80 percent). News and political programs make up most of the programming. Reception in the broad vicinity of Belgrade.

TV Politika (Belgrade)—An enterprise that is part of the Politika company; in operation since 28 June 1990. The news programming is based on the nightly news programs "The Day" (at 1830 and 2200 hours every day). There are both scripted and "live" programs. The entertainment broadcasting consists of music, films, and children's programs. The hours of broadcasting are from 0700 to 0900 hours and from 1500 to 0130 hours after midnight, and from 0800 hours throughout the day without interruption on Saturday and Sunday. Reception in the city of Belgrade and the broad vicinity.

ART Channel (Belgrade)—Private enterprise ART, television culture channel; in operation since 31 July 1992. The programming is not commercial, but it operates on commercial principles (it is supported by advertising). Complete orientation toward subject matter concerning art and culture. Encourages scripted and documentary programs on specific topics and problems. Recently, it began direct broadcasts of cultural events in Belgrade. Reception in 95 percent of Belgrade.

TV Palma (Belgrade)—Unclear legal and ownership status (data difficult to obtain). TV station of the commercial type. Broadcasts entertainment programs with little, almost negligible, production of its own. Aside from films and foreign series, new versions of folk music take up most of the room. Reception in the city of Belgrade and vicinity.

TV Pink (Belgrade)—Private TV station. In operation since this September. Commercial type with programming similar to TV Palma (new versions of folk music).

BKT (Belgrade)—Private enterprise BK Telekom (owned by the Karic brothers). Has just begun to operate. From some things we have learned, the programming plan has been rather ambitiously conceived, at least judging by the people recruited from other Belgrade television studios.

TV Krusevac (Krusevac)—Opstina television station; in operation since 28 June 1991. Pattern of programming: news programming, specialized programs, musical and entertainment programs. Rebroadcasts Channel 3 of the RTS. Operates 24 hours a day carrying satellite programming. Reception in the Rasina District.

TV Smederevo (Smederevo)—Public enterprise; in operation since 14 October 1993. Pattern of programming: news, topical programs, sports, music, films. No political programs. Broadcasts a total of three hours of programming a day. Reception in the Branicevo area of the Danube valley and part of Banat.

TV Galaksija (Cacak)—Private television station; in operation since 1992. Pattern of programming: local programming (programs from daily life), sports, music, films. In all, broadcasts 10 hours of programming a day. Reception in the area of Cacak and environs.

TV Spectrum (Cacak)—Private television station; in operation since 1992. Programming of the commercial type.

TV Kraljevo (Kraljevo)—Public news enterprise (founded by the Kraljevo Opstina Assembly); in operation since March 1993. Pattern of programming: news programs (with the prime time program "Today"), documentaries, music, sports, films, public service information, and advertising. Received in an area larger than the opstina.

Bor TV (Bor)—Public enterprise Stampa Radio i Film; founder—Bor Opstina Assembly; in operation since May 1993. Pattern of programming: news, culture and entertainment, and collage-type programs. In all, broadcasts five hours of programming in the winter and slightly more in the summertime. Reception in the city.

TV Zajecar (Zajecar)—Public enterprise of Timok Television. Going into operation in early 1995.

TV Krajina (Negotin)—Private television station; in operation since 1991. Pattern of programming: news programming (local in nature), programs on the economy and politics, culture, films, music, live broadcasts (theater...). Advertising spread throughout all the programming. Rebroadcasts the programming of TV Politika. In all, broadcasts 8-10 hours of programming a day. Reception in an area 15 km wide.

CT Negotin (Negotin)—Private cable television; in operation since 1991. Pattern of programming: commercial programming, some news and political programs (raw material). Rebroadcasts segments of programming of Studio B. It is seen by half the city and 70 percent of the villages around Negotin.

TV 5 (Uzice)—Private television station; in operation since August 1994. Pattern of programming: programs for children (cartoons), films, foreign music, advertising. Receives satellite programming. On the air from 2000 to 2400 hours in the evening. Reception in the center of the city.

Channel 7 (Vrnjacka Banja)—Private television station; in operation since December 1993. Pattern of programming: news (related to Vrnjacka Banja). Carries the programming of TV Kraljevo or TV Krusevac. On the air in the evening hours.

TV Bajina Basta (Bajina Basta)—Opstina television; in operation since 1990. Pattern of programming: information (in the form of printed text), reporting (occasional), films, music, local advertising, programming from satellite. Rebroadcasts some programs of TV Politika. On the air 24 hours, only two hours of its own programming. Reception in the city proper.

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TV Center Sabac (Sabac)—Public news enterprise; founder—opstina assembly with RTS; in operation since February 1994. Pattern of programming: news (local news related to the Macva District), children's programming, cultural programs, and also sports, entertainment, and public programs. Rebroadcasts the program "Serbia Today" and the second nightly news program of RTS. On the air from 1700 to 2300 hours. Reception over a much broader territory than the Macva District (coincides with the signal of Studio B).

TV Loznica (Loznica)—Private television station; in operation since 1992. Pattern of programming: news (local and related to the economy), films, advertising, classified ads. Broadcasts one hour of its own programming; the rest is satellite programming (mainly sports). Reception in the city of Loznica.

TV 5 (Nis)—Private television station; in operation since 1993. Pattern of programming: news (local news in the morning and evening), service information, programs for students, quiz programs, science programs, foreign series, films, music. No political programs. On the air 24 hours a day, about 10 hours of its own programming. Reception in the city and immediate vicinity.

TV Banker (Nis)—Private television station; in operation since 1993. Pattern of programming: city news, programs for children, films, music. After its own programming (a total of 10 hours), it rebroadcasts the music channel via satellite (MTV). Reception in the city of Nis.

TV Najs (Nis)—Private television station; in operation since June of this year. Pattern of programming: films, music, advertising—24 hours a day. Reception in an area 70 km wide.

Channel 9 (Kragujevac)—Private television station; in operation since 22 May 1993. Pattern of programming: aside from the local news programming, broadcasts collage programs and potpourri TV programs, films, and music request programs with dedications. They avoid political programs. About 10 hours of programming they produce themselves, and the remainder to the end of the day is programming via satellite.

Studio Subotica (Subotica)—Cable network (via the Subotica Post Office); belongs to TV Novi Sad, but broadcasts a local program for Subotica; in operation since March 1993. Pattern of programming: the news segment (local), a topical mosaic after the news, documentary and entertainment and recreational programming, a culture segment, sports (quite a bit of time). They "take" from the satellite what is of interest to them. They broadcast about five hours of programming (from 1700 to 2230 hours) five days a week.

Cable TV Senta (Senta)—Private cable television; in operation since 1990. Broadcasts 29 cable channels. One channel is for local news, and over the others it broadcasts the programming of state television and certain satellite programs.

K 33 (Vrsac)—Part of a public newspaper publishing enterprise; in operation since May 1992. Pattern of programming: local news and chronicles. There is also culture, sports, and music. Has three to four hours of its own programming; the rest is filled with satellite programming. Rebroadcasts Studio B (nightly news).

Kosovo

Serb Police Raid LDK Commission Office

AU0501211295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 5 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] At about 0600 this morning, a force of 15 Serbian policemen raided the building of the Central Commission for Solidarity of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] in Prishtina. The Serbian police interventions continued in other places in Kosova. Mehmet Haziri is on the line from Prishtina:

[Haziri] The Kosova Information Center reports that the offices of the LDK Commission for Solidarity were raided for two hours without the presence of any of the members of this commission, apart from some persons in the street who were violently taken as witnesses.

Hamdi Gervalla, one of the functionaries of this solidarity association, declared that during the raid, the Serbian policemen broke lamp shades, walls, floor, furniture, and desk drawers. They also confiscated a part of the documentation of this commission.

Reports confirm that the police raided the rooms of the house and [word indistinct] where this commission was located. The owner of the house was arrested during the raid, with no further clarification.

The LDK Central Commission for Solidarity has been legally operating in this building for four years and this is the second time it has been raided.

The commission has so far done a great work in collecting and distributing humanitarian aid for citizens of the Republic of Kosova. During the latest raid a month ago, the Serbian policemen threatened the activists of this commission to stop work under the pretext that the commission has not been registered with the Serbian authorities.

The Kosova Information Center also reports raids in Hertice village in Podujeve and the aims of the Serbian authorities in Kamenice to set up 26 buildings for Serbian colonists.

The Belgrade regime has recently actualized the question of the colonization of Kosova, by considering this to be a priority task for the Serbian Government.

In an interview with the Serbian paper JEDINSTVO of Prishtina, Vekoslav Sesevic, minister in the Serbian Government in charge of economic affairs in Kosovo, declared that the Serbian Government has granted a fund of 3.5 million dinars from its budget to build houses for Serbian refugees in Kosova.

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